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In response to transnational crises of terrorism, poverty, environment and war, 
scholars have become increasingly interested in how democratic global governance 
might be brought to bear on the anarchical international system. Surprisingly, 
however, the literature on global governance has largely ignored the recent 
“deliberative turn” in democratic political theory. Nevertheless, there have been a 
few systematic attempts at bringing together these two literatures. Unfortunately, 
these attempts have given contradictory advice, advocating different political spaces 
from which to anchor deliberative and democratic global governance. This 
dissertation tries to sort through the disagreements to provide philosophical 
clarification and direction to this incipient scholarly union. I argue that rather than 
building theories around one particular venue of governance, deliberative democrats 
need to figure out how states, global civil society, and international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) can work together to mutually buttress a deliberative and 
democratic global order. I further contend that while scholars of deliberative 
democracy have done a good job of showing how states and civil society could 
become more deeply democratic, they have not paid satisfactory attention to the 
democratic potential of IGOs. I end the dissertation by showing why IGOs ought to 
move towards deliberative and democratic ideals, illustrating my position with 
specific suggestions for reforming the U. N. Security Council.
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C hapter 1 
Introduction
Many speak of world peace, yet relatively few systematically search for it. 
Historically, political theorists and philosophers have been no exception, addressing 
their ideas of justice to domestic rather than to the global order. But faced with 
international crises of health, security, population, poverty, and environment, political 
thinkers are increasingly exploring how better global governance might be achieved.1 
At the same time as scholarly interest in global governance has increased, so too has 
scholarly interest in how the quality and amount of discourse and deliberation can 
deepen democratic governance. Indeed, democratic political theory has taken such a 
“deliberative turn” that it is rare to encounter a serious enquiry into democratic 
legitimacy that fails to take into account the discourse and deliberation within and 
around political institutions.2
Although the scholarship of global governance and deliberative democracy 
have grown simultaneously, the implications of the their union has received little 
philosophic attention. As Chambers notes, “ Iliere does appear to be a growing 
discussion of transnational governance in general, even if it is not informed by
'Some scholars use “governance” to mean order that is achieved through both 
governmental and non-govemmcntal institutions and practices. Others limit 
"governance" to the non-govemmentaJ sphere. In this dissertation I use the former 
understanding of governance
John Dryzek. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals. Critics, 
C ontestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1.
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deliberative democratic theory in particular.”3 This is surprising, as there is nothing 
intrinsic in deliberative democratic theory that would preclude its scope from 
extending into the global. This is not to say that deliberative democrats are unaware 
that the world is becoming increasingly globalized, however. Certainly the effects of 
globalization (especially the economic effects) are commonly referenced in many 
works of deliberative democracy. Unfortunately, awareness of globalization has not 
led to the proliferation of careful and systematic scholarship on how the ideas and 
ideals of deliberative democracy might inform pursuits of democratic global 
governance.
Although the intersection of deliberative democracy and global governance 
has not received as much attention as one might expect, there have been impressive 
forays into the implications of their union. Dennis Thompson, John Dryzek, and 
David Held, for example, all put forward well developed theories of global 
governance which incorporate insights from the literature of deliberative democracy. 
As each of their theories focuses on a different, and indeed critical, venue of global 
governance (the state, global civil society, and international governmental 
organizations, respectively), careful analysis of their ideas is of urgent need as 
scholars try to find democratic ways of providing global order.4 In this dissertation I
3Simone Chambers. 2003. Deliberative Democratic Theory, Annual Revue o f  
Political Science 6: 307-26.
4James Bohman is another deliberative democrat who has tried to apply 
deliberative democracy to global governance. My dissertation does not critically 
analyze his works for two reasons. First, there is overlap between his ideas and John 
Dryzek’s, in that both advocate a strong global civil society. Second, and more
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will undertake such an analysis in the hope of shedding light on how deliberative 
democracy can be profitably applied to each of the three venues of governance; 
moreover, by dissertation’s end I hope to have shown how states, global civil society, 
and international governmental organizations (IGOs) can work together to provide 
deliberative and democratic global governance.5
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Before I foreshadow the issues and arguments that are to come in the chapters 
that follow, I want to give the reader a brief overview of what exactly deliberative 
democratic theory is. There are a number of review articles and books which do an 
excellent job detailing the differences between theories of deliberative democracy.6 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it will be sufficient to simply make the reader
importantly, in my evaluation Bohman fails to seriously address many of the 
important and complex issues of global governance, thus I simply do not have much 
to say about his ideas on the global public sphere other than I agree that a strong 
public sphere would indeed be helpful to global governance. See James Bohman.
1999. The Globalization of the Public Sphere: Cosmopolitan Publicity and the 
Problem of Cultural Pluralism, Philosophy and Social Criticism. 24: 199-216.
5IGOs are international political institutions in which members are nation­
states. Some examples of IGOs are the United Nations, the European Union, OPEC, 
the World Bank, and the Organization of American States. NGOs (sometimes 
abbreviated as INGOs) are international institutions, such as Amnesty International 
and the Nature Conservancy, that have members that are not official representatives 
of nation-states.
6See, for example, Samuel Freeman. 2000. Deliberative Democracy: A 
Sympathetic Comment Philosophy and Public Affairs. 29 (4): 370-418; James 
Bohman and William Rehg. 1997. Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and 
Politics. Cambridge: MIT Press; John Elster, ed. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Chambers 2003.
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aware of the reasons that are generally given for supporting deliberative conceptions 
of democracy, as the scholarship on the union of deliberative democracy and global 
governance is in such an early stage of development that fine-tuned distinctions will 
rarely come into play. That said, it will be necessary to address the nuances of the 
deliberative democracy theories that my dissertation will critically analyze. 
Nevertheless, in order to avoid unnecessary complication at this point, I will bracket 
those discussions until later chapters when Thompson’s, Dryzek’s, and Held’s 
understandings of deliberative democracy can be placed in the context of their 
theories of global governance.
At the core of most theories of deliberative democracy is the belief that 
meaningful discourse and deliberation in the public sphere, civil society, and in 
democratic political institutions ought to be facilitated as often and as fairly possible.7 
The underlying support for this belief generally comes from three, not entirely 
distinct, foundations: Habermasian discourse theory, Millian arguments touting the 
contestation of ideas, and Rousseauean ideas of political legitimacy.8 I will look 
briefly at each of these foundations, as doing so will not only explain why scholars are 
attracted to deliberative democracy, but will also shed light on the goals of
7 See Jurgen Habermas. 1981. Theory o f Communicative Action. Transl. 
Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press; Simone Chambers. 1996. Reasonable 
Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics o f  Discourse. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press; Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson. 1996. Democracy and 
Disagreement: Why Moral Conflict Cannot Be Avoided in Politics and What Should 
Be Done. Cambridge: MIT Press; Carlos Santiago Nino. 1996. The Constitution o f  
Deliberative Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
8Freeman 2000.
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deliberative democracy.
Habermasian discourse theory holds that in order to be justifiably confident of 
the “truth” or “justice” of a political outcome (a law or a policy), it must be the result 
of a fair deliberation. In order for a deliberation to be fair, it must fulfill two basic 
requirements. First, the deliberation should allow for the equal participation by those 
affected.9 And second, participants in the deliberation must attempt to approximate 
an “ideal communication community” or “the equivalent concept of the ‘ideal speech 
situation.’”10 This requires that participants be willing to abstract themselves from 
“the unequal distribution of attention, competences, and knowledge within a public” 
and to ignore personal “attitudes and motives at cross-purposes to the orientation to 
mutual understanding.” Thus, participants in a fair deliberation do their best to ignore 
or avoid “egocentrism, weakness of will, irrationality, and self-deception.”11 In short, 
if participants in deliberation have the right mind set (and are protected from outside 
distractions and non-ideal forces) then the better argument will carry the day.
For Habermas, and those deliberative democrats who follow his lead, the 
“better argument” can only (or at least most reliably) come forward in actual 
deliberations with real people. This is because only through actual deliberation can
JJurgen Habermas. 1997. Popular Sovereignty as Procedure. Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Eds. Bohman and Rehg. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
' ' Jurgen Habermas. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a 
Discourse Theory o f Law and Politics. Trans. William Rehg. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, p. 322.
"Ibid. p., 325.
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“the counterfactual presuppostions assumed by participants in argumentation.. . 
open up a perspective allowing them to go beyond local practices of justification and 
to transcend the provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts that are inescapable in 
action and experience.”12 This means, in contradistinction to Rawls, the philosopher 
cannot simply place his thoughts behind “a veil of ignorance” to deduce the most 
justified political conclusion, as the philosopher could never “transcend the 
provinciality” of his “spatiotemporal context” in the absence of actual discourse 
within a real communication community.13 Although ideal discourse can never be 
fully realized in our less than ideal world, according Habermas’s theory of discourse, 
approximating fair deliberation is the most reliable method of discerning political 
truth and justice.14
Closely related to the Habbermas’s epistemic support for deliberative 
democracy are Millian arguments in support deliberative democracy.15 In On Liberty, 
John Stuart Mill argues that speech from all viewpoints should be encouraged. Even 
in the rare case when a belief is entirely false, voicing that belief still has salutary 
effects on the community.16 And if voicing false opinions is salutary, then expressing 
all range of opinions should be encouraged. Similarly, some deliberative democrats
,2Ibid. p. 323.
13Ibid.
l4See Nino 1996, p. 124.
I5Freeman, 2000, pp. 383-84.
l6John Stuart Mill. 1975. On Liberty. New York: Norton, p. 18.
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contend that deliberative democracy ought to be preferred because it encourages all 
types of “political talk” -  and when multiple perspectives are voiced, relevant 
information is more likely to inform political discourses, and flawed reasoning can be
• • 17exposed and avoided, increasing the quality and reliability of legislative outcomes. 
Moreover, having partisans argue their positions in public fora encourages them to 
frame their arguments in terms of the common good, as they attempt to persuade their 
opponents and the undecided audience. Framing arguments in terms of the common 
good not only serves to persuade the audience, but may also ideologically move the 
advocate herself closer to her communication community’s general interests, and 
away from her, or her group’s, particular interests, which is generally considered to be 
a positive change.18
The third foundation commonly encountered in the literature of deliberative 
democracy is a Rousseauean conception of political legitimacy.19 Rousseau thought 
that in order for government to be legitimate, the creation of the laws must be 
generated from the governed; otherwise Man, bom to be free, would remain
l7See Philip Pettit. 1997. Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 277-79,189,192, cited in Freeman 2000, p. 383.
18Chambers documents this affect in the language debates of Quebec. See 
Chambers 1996, pp. 212-227; see also John Elster. 1997. The Market and the Forum: 
Three Varieties of Political Theory. In Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason 
and Politics. Eds. Bohman and Rehg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.
19Freeman 2000.
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“everywhere in chains.”20 Drawing on Rousseau’s idea of citizens being free when 
ruled by laws of their own creation, proponents of deliberative democracy advocate 
“talk-centric” political frameworks, as those affected by laws and policies have 
greater input into their creation than they would under less discursive forms of 
governance.21 Although only a small minority of citizens actually participate in the 
creation of and the voting on legislation, citizens can affect outcomes by voicing their 
perspectives and ideas in the public sphere.22 The public sphere discourse (especially 
when a consensus forms) pressures legislators to justify their decisions with reasons 
that address the concerns and conclusions reached by citizens in the public sphere. 
Furthermore, citizens indirectly influence the creation of laws by selecting their 
governmental representatives. Elections not only give citizens a choice of who will 
create the laws they are to live under, but the shadow of re-election forces legislators 
to engage citizens in public sphere discourse.23 Thus, because deliberative democracy 
allows for, indeed encourages, those affected by political decisions to directly and 
indirectly participate in the creation of laws, deliberative democracy is held to be a
20Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 1968. The Social Contract. London: Penguin 
Books, p. 49.
21 Joshua Cohen. 1989. Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy. In The 
Good Polity: Normative Analysis o f the State. Eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 17-34; Bernard Manin, 1987. On Legitimacy and 
Political Deliberation. Political Theory. 15: 338-68; Gutman and Thompson 1996.
22Bohman 1999; John Dryzek. 2001. Legitimacy and Economy in 
Deliberative Democracy. Political Theory. 29 (5): 651-669.
^Nadia Urbinati. 2000. Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic 
Deliberation. Political Theory. 28 (6): 758-786.
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justifiable method of political decision-making.24
Regardless of whether a theorist bases her advocacy of deliberative democracy
on a Habermassian, Millian, or a Rousseauian foundation (or some combination of
the three), most would agree that a deliberative democratic society should seek to
fulfill some basic goals. In an informative and wonderfully concise distillation of the
major works of deliberative democracy, Samuel Freeman summarizes the generally
accepted goals of deliberative democracy as follows:
Conceived as an ideal of political relations, a deliberative democracy is one in 
which political agents or their representatives (a) aim to collectively deliberate 
and vote (b) their sincere and informed judgments regarding (c) measures 
conducive to the common good of citizens, (d) Political agents are seen and 
see one another as democratic citizens who are politically free and equal 
participants in civic life, (e) A background of constitutional rights and all­
purpose social means enable citizens to take advantage of their opportunities 
to participate in public life, (f) Citizens are individually free in that they have 
their own freely determined conceptions of the good, and these conceptions 
are publicly seen as legitimate even though they are independent of political 
purposes. Moreover, (g) free citizens have diverse and incongruous 
conceptions of the good, which are constitutionally protected by basic rights. 
Because of this diversity (h) citizens recognize a duty in their public political 
deliberations to cite public reasons—considerations that all reasonable citizens 
can accept in their capacity as democratic citizens—and to avoid public 
argument on the basis of reasons peculiar to their particular moral, religious, 
and philosophical views and incompatible with public reason, (i) What makes 
these reasons public is that they are related to and in some way advance the 
common interests of citizens, (j) Primary among the common interests of 
citizens are their freedom, independence, and equal civic status.25
Certainly individual deliberative democratic theorists may disagree with one or more
of the above elements, but for the purposes of giving a concise overview of the major
24Dryzek 2001, pp. 657-69.
25Freeman 2000, p.382.
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themes of deliberative democracy, Freeman’s synopsis is helpful.
In this dissertation, I am interested in looking broadly at how ideas of 
deliberative democracy might guide our pursuit of democratic global governance. Of 
course, I do not presume that discourse and deliberation are the only important 
elements of democratic global governance. Rather, I go into this project assuming 
that institutional history, power, economics and other variables are of profound 
importance to our evaluation of the depth of democracy and must be taken into 
account.
Moreover, when judging a venue of global governance to be democratic or 
undemocratic, there are three key considerations that ought to inform our 
determinations. First, we should consider decision-making procedures, as it would be 
difficult to conclude that an outcome is democratic if it was decided in a patently 
undemocratic manner. Second, we should consider whether participation is coerced. 
Even if a venue of global governance has perfectly democratic procedures, it would 
be problematic to judge it democratic if its discourse and votes are a reflection of 
threats and coercion rather than genuine conviction and choice. And third, we must 
consider whether there is reason to believe that political outcomes represent fairly the 
will of the relevant demos. After all, if there is little reason to believe that a venue of 
global governance is representative of the relevant demos, then there would be little 
reason to attribute to it democratic authority. When judging a venue of global 
governance to be democratic or undemocratic, scholars are often imprecise as to 
which of the above three elements are driving their conclusions. In this dissertation, I
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will try to be as clear as possible as to which of the three considerations is informing
our judgements.26
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Deliberative democrats have spilt much ink working through what 
deliberative democracy requires of domestic governance.27 Unfortunately, how 
deliberative democracy could be applied to international relations and global 
governance has received only limited attention. Nonetheless, a handful of political 
philosophers have tried to think through what deliberative democracy might offer and 
require of global governance. In an important work on cosmopolitan society, David 
Held calls for local, regional and global layers of deliberative and democratic 
governance.28 But others have not found his answers to some of the more 
complicated questions of global democracy persuasive. Dennis Thompson, for 
example, thinks that Held’s theory runs into a major problem. Thompson contends 
that multiple layers of governance will actually decrease citizen influence, as 
international institutions are further removed from citizen control than are domestic
26Judging an institution or scheme of governance to be democratically 
legitimate does not mean that there is no need to deepen the democratic nature of its 
governance. Even in those venues of governance we consider to be our most 
democratic, there is certainly plenty of room for improvement.
27As mentioned, if their theories do not explicitly limit themselves to the 
domestic, then it is generally implicit.
28David Held. 1995. Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern 
State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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institutions. Thompson concludes that “for the foreseeable future the power exercised 
by states (and their sub-governmental units) is likely to be more legitimate (more 
justifiable to the persons bound by them) than that exercised by other institutions.”29
Thompson indeed recognizes the utility of deliberative democracy in solving 
increasingly troubling international problems, but for Thompson nation-states are the 
significant loci of global governance and his prescription for a just world order is to 
make certain that states, rather than international institutions, are deliberatively and 
democratically just. Although Thompson has considered both the international 
system and deliberative theory, his cursory discussion of IGOs may be problematic, as 
he explores states as they could be but only considers at IGOs as they are.30 
Furthermore, Thompson does not seem to consider that even in a system of 
deliberatively just states, many problems might be better handled at the international 
level of governance.
In contrast to Thompson, John Dryzek applies the precepts of deliberative 
democracy to the international level of governance.31 Dryzek contends that IGOs are
29Dennis Thompson. 1999. Democratic Theory and Global Society. The 
Journal o f Political Philosophy. 1: 111-125, at p. 118.
■°Thompson also conceives the relationship between local, state, and 
international institutions as more distinct and hierarchical than it actually is. For an 
informative discussion of the horizontal and “leaky” relationship between layers of 
democracy, as opposed the vertical and “determined” relationship, see S.L. Hurley. 
1999. Rationality, Democracy and Leaky Boundaries: Vertical vs. Horizontal 
Modularity. The Journal o f Political Philosophy. 7: 126-146.
'John Dryzek. 1999. Transnational Democracy. The Journal o f  Political
Philosophy. 7: 30-51.
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neither democratic nor profitably discursive and hence focuses our attention on the 
discourse of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which tend to 
have grassroots foundations. But Dryzek’s assertion that IGOs are less democratic 
than NGOs may not be entirely convincing, as Dryzek never seems to explain why 
international organizations and other elements of global civil society that spring from 
the grassroots have more democratic legitimacy than formal governmental 
institutions. Do not many domestic grassroots interest groups fail to represent the 
people as a whole, or even a majority? Furthermore, many grassroots NGOs oppose 
each other with contradictory advice.32 How would we decide which grassroots 
participants in global civil society ought to be our democratic touchstones? Certainly 
Dryzek is correct that democratic global governance needs a strong global civil 
society to keep a watchful eye on formal governmental institutions and to generate 
ideas on how best to go about global governance, but these other questions would 
need to be answered before we could rely on global civil society to anchor democratic 
global governance.
Thompson and Dryzek, are each persuasive in advocating his preferred 
method of democratic global governance. Nonetheless, without satisfactory 
justification, both pay little attention to the justice, power, and the democratic 
potential of IGO governance, yet each believes his theory sufficient to solve 
complicated global problems. Are they correct? If not, would theorists of
Paul Wapner. 1997. Governance in Global Civil Society. In Oran Young, 
ed. Global Governance: Insights From the Environmental Experience. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
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deliberative democracy be compelled to accept Held’s advocacy of cosmopolitan 
IGOs? Or, is it possible to incorporate IGOs into a theory of deliberative and 
democratic global governance without embracing the cosmopolitanism which Held 
advocates? This dissertation will take a careful look at Thompson’s, Dryzek’s, and 
Held’s theories in order to answer these questions in the hope of providing guidance 
to future deliberative democratic scholarship. Because the divisions between these 
three scholars are often rooted in their understandings of IGO governance, I will pay 
special attention to how their ideas speak to the deliberative and democratic 
legitimacy and the governance potential of IGOs.
THE DISSERTATION
The international system is not governed by a world state. Most political 
theorists and philosophers think the rise of a world state is not just unlikely, but that 
the dangers presented by it, such as the possibility of universal tyranny, make it 
unwanted. This leaves the political theorist with international anarchy. Scholars have 
persuasively argued that even under anarchy, there is still space for significant levels 
of international cooperation and governance, however.33 As Wendt famously put it,
See Robert Keohane. 2001. Governance in a Partially Globalized World: 
Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2000. American 
Political Science Review. 95 (1): 1-13; Robert Keohane. 1984. After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Dryzek 1999; Held 1995; Alexander Wendt. 1999. Social Theory 
o f International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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“anarchy is what states make of it.”34 If this is at all plausible, then we ought to ask 
ourselves how exactly deliberative democracy can contribute to our search for 
justifiable global governance. In short, my dissertation will seek to understand 
whether and how citizens and states can make of the international system a type of 
“deliberative anarchy.”
In this chapter I have given background to the scholarship of deliberative 
democracy and its relationship to global governance. In chapter two I will carefully 
examine Dennis Thompson’s ideas of democratic global governance. Specifically, I 
will look at Thompson’s contention that we should continue to focus on ways of 
improving the state, rather than the international, level of deliberative democracy to 
improve global order. Thompson attacks IGO governance on two fronts. First, IGOs 
lack democratic legitimacy. Thompson contends that because IGOs are further 
removed from citizen control, and because they create overlapping authorities, IGOs 
do not have the democratic legitimacy to authoritatively address global problems.
And second, even if IGOs were legitimate, they are not powerful enough to provide 
effective governance. Drawing on the basic tenets of deliberative democracy and 
international relations theory, I will critically examine both positions. After 
addressing these two concerns, I will then look at the positive insights Thompson has 
put forward as to how democratic states should be reformed to better handle 
transnational problems, and how reformed deliberative states could more legitimately
34 Alexander Wendt. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics. International Organization. 88 (2): 391-425.
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represent their “moral constituents,” who often live beyond domestic borders.
In the third chapter I will look at John Dryzek’s contention that global civil 
society, through the creation of “discourse networks,” is best positioned to provide 
legitimate global governance. There are two main issues that need to be considered. 
First, Dryzek argues that powerful IGOs are hopelessly undemocratic. Commenting 
on IGOs, Dryzek asserts “at best, this is democracy at one remove, piggybacking on 
any degree of democracy present in the states involved.”35 Is he correct? In order to 
assess Dryzek’s claim, I will build on the discussion of IGO legitimacy from chapter 
two, and add to it a more careful inquiry into the requirements of deliberative and 
democratic legitimacy as it relates to IGO governance. Second, I will take a careful 
look at whether the “discourse networks” Dryzek proposes could indeed provide the 
depth of global governance that he claims. Even though I believe Dryzek’s account of 
democratic global governance has problems that need to be taken into account, his 
insights into the role that global civil society could potentially play are important and 
I will end the chapter with an evaluation of which of Dryzek’s ideas ought to be 
dismissed and which ought to be embraced.
In the fourth chapter I will critically analyze David Held’s theory of 
cosmopolitan democracy. There are three basic questions that I will try to answer. 
First, could IGOs provide the amount of governance Held believes they capable of? 
Second, is Held providing a model for our world, or is he speaking of a 
problematically idealized world that has little resemblance to our own? And if
35Dryzek 1999, p.30.
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Held’s theory is problematically idealized, are there positive insights that might yet be 
retained, even if they are not the ones that Held intended? And third, is Held 
persuasive in his advocacy of cosmopolitan, rather than state-centric, IGOs? In 
answering these questions, we should gain clearer insight into the role IGOs ought to 
play in deliberative democratic global governance, and into whether IGOs should play 
that role as international institutions or cosmopolitan institutions.
At the completion of chapter four I will have looked at what I believe are the 
three most important venues of governance (states, global civil society, and IGOs) 
from which deliberative democrats should anchor their theories of global order. 
Throughout chapters two, three and four, I will have argued that parts of each theory 
should be dismissed, while other aspects give helpful insights into democratic global 
governance. In chapter five, I will conclude the dissertation by showing how the 
positive aspects from each theory can be combined to provide a more compelling 
framework of deliberative and democratic global governance. But, I will argue, 
simply combining the theories is not sufficient, as not enough theoretical work has 
been done on how deliberative democracy could improve IGO governance. I will 
then outline reasons to believe that making IGOs more deliberative would improve 
their democratic legitimacy and their ability to govern. I will end my dissertation by 
illustrating the types of deliberative and democratic changes that IGOs should make 
by suggesting specific reforms for the UN Security Council.
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Chapter 2
On Dennis Thompson’s State-Level Approach to Global Governance
In this chapter, I will examine Dennis Thompson’s contention that we ought to 
look to domestic deliberative democracies, rather than to international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) or global civil society, to provide the bulk of global governance. 
Consideration of this position is important for three reasons. First, the nation-state is 
the traditional locus of political power. If making domestic states more deliberative 
and democratic is the primary solution to the problems of providing global 
governance, then there would not be a pressing need for deliberative democratic 
theorists to expand their theories significantly beyond their usual scope. Second, 
Thompson tries to bring the discourse of global governance back to the domestic state 
by arguing directly against “cosmopolitanism” (which advocates increased IGO 
governance) and “civil societarianism” (which is centered around the governance 
potential of discourse in global civil society). Thus, in determining whether domestic 
deliberative democracies should be expected to sufficiently solve global governance 
problems, I will also be able to reconsider other potential venues of global 
governance, in light of Thompson’s ideas and criticisms. And finally, an answer to 
the question of whether supranational solutions to global governance are flawed 
and/or illegitimate, as Thompson believes, is politically relevant. Today, many 
assume that IGOs such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
are illegitimate, and some even take to the streets in protest. If Thompson is right,
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then maybe we too ought to be actively resisting IGOs’ illegitimate encroachments on 
state sovereignty.
THOMPSON’S LIBERAL RIGHTS CRITIQUE OF COSMOPOLITANISM
Thompson defines the cosmopolitans as those democratic theorists who 
“inspired by the universalist aspirations of Enlightenment philosophers like Kant... 
pin their hopes on strengthening regional and international forums in order both to 
protect liberal rights and to enhance democratic decision-making.”1 He thinks 
cosmopolitanism’s vision is compelling on its face but upon further consideration 
deeply problematical: “As a guiding conception for democratic theory, 
cosmopolitanism has serious defects both in its liberalism and in its democracy, and 
therefore in the way that it combines them.”2 Thompson believes cosmopolitanism’s 
vision is prima facia compelling because when we think of liberal rights being 
protected by international organizations, we are likely to envision extra layers of 
protection for non-controversial rights -  such as negative rights against rape and 
torture or positive rights to health and education.3 But, according to Thompson, once 
put into practice, this simple vision proves misleading.
The first problem is that the rights most steadfastly promoted and protected by 
IGOs (which play the central role in cosmopolitan theories) are economic rights
'Thompson 1999, p 114.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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embodied in free markets, and “in the absence of any political authority to limit these 
rights when they threaten to undermine other liberal rights, economic liberalism is 
likely to dominate, even more than it does in domestic contexts.”4 Cosmopolitan 
theorists do call for political authorities to regulate international capital exchanges 
and investment, however.5 Thus, Thompson must be saying that if implemented, 
cosmopolitan strategies would likely fail to control globalizing economic pressures. 
But even if IGOs do tend to foster rather than limit economic liberalism, Thompson 
has not given reasons to believe that economic rights will often, or at least more than 
just occasionally, undermine the protection of other liberal rights.6 Empirical studies 
suggest otherwise.
In the early 1990s, for example, there was much speculation concerning a 
“race to the welfare bottom.”7 The common wisdom was that with the growth of free 
markets along with increased capital and corporate mobility, states would no longer 
be able simultaneously to provide robust welfare rights (extensive child care, health 
care, education, and social security) while maintaining a healthy, growing economy,
4Ibid.
"David Held, for example, wants transnational economic activities to be 
accountable to parliaments and assemblies at the regional and global levels; Held 
1995, p. 279.
6Many cosmopolitans and civil societarians make the same under­
substantiated assumption.
7See David Andrews. 1994. Capital Mobility and State Autonomy. 
International Studies Quarterly. 38: 193-216; Phillip Cemey. 1990. The Changing 
Architecture o f Politics. London: Sage.
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as states with robust welfare rights have to extract higher rents from corporations (and 
their resident executives) than the corporations (and their executives) are apt to 
tolerate.8 In the face of such rents, corporations, investment, and other capital 
resources would relocate to states with fewer welfare benefits and lower rents, leaving 
robust welfare states high and dry, economically speaking. Knowing their economic 
destiny, states would be forced to drastically scale back their social welfare 
provisions.9 However, the most recent and rigorous studies looking for this expected 
effect have concluded that despite anecdotal evidence to the contrary, there is no 
statistical reason to believe that states are engaged in a “race to the welfare bottom.”10 
Surprisingly, in his concluding discussion on the potential of states to control 
global economic pressures, Thompson appears to be aware that the race to the welfare 
bottom is not an inevitable consequence of globalization. Speaking of it, he says,
“But it is easy to exaggerate the effects on the autonomy of domestic governments.. .  
The most reliable recent studies show that the effects of international capital mobility 
are ‘contingent on the choices of national policymakers’ and their domestic 
institutions.”" But if Thompson recognizes that even in an economic world
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
l0Geoffrey Garrett. 1998. Global Markets and National Politics: Collision
Course or Virtuous Circle? International Organization. 52: 787-824; Andrew 
Sobel. 1994. Domestic Choices, International Markets: Dismantling National 
Barriers and Liberalizing Securities. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
"Thompson 1999, p. 119.
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characterized by free trade there is still significant policy space for domestic control 
and choice, how does it necessarily follow that IGO support of free trade will likely 
undermine the protection of other liberal rights?12 Furthermore, Thompson never 
directly argues against the liberal preference for allowing the free flows of goods, 
services, and capital across borders. In fact, at one point he lumps economic 
freedoms in with other “liberal rights.”13 Thus it would seem that the facilitation of 
free trade, one of our liberal rights, actually ought to be a prima facia reason for 
supporting rather than rejecting, IGOs.
In addition, the idea that most barriers to free trade represent the “will of the 
people,” or are in place for the benefit of the demos, is suspect. In The Rise and 
Decline o f Economic Powers, Mancur Olson showed persuasively that barriers to free 
trade are neither a result of democratic will nor instituted for the benefit of the people 
as a whole.14 Rather, the presence of state trade barriers is primarily determined by 
the political strength of special interest groups (usually corporations) that have 
particular stakes in seeing trade barriers erected. The majority of the population, on 
the other hand, tend to have generalized interests in a strong economy and the cheaper 
goods that free trade facilitates.15 Again it seems that Thompson’s first argument
,2Ibid„ p. 114.
l3Ibid.
l4Mancur Olson. 1982. The Rise and Decline o f Nations: Economic Growth, 
Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1 Ibid; Robert Reich. 1991. The Work o f Nations: Preparing Ourselves for  
21st Century Capitalism. New York: Knopf.
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against cosmopolitanism -  that the IGOs it promotes would foster increased free trade 
-  might be a reason to lean towards its acceptance.
The second problem Thompson sees with having IGOs protect and promote 
liberal rights is that “as soon as we move beyond basic liberties recognized in 
international law and advocated by the human rights movement, internal conflicts 
break out within liberalism itself. The more communities or nations come under the 
dominion of liberal rights, the greater the likelihood of disagreement about what the 
rights should mean.”16 It is not the promotion of liberal rights that Thompson, a 
liberal, finds problematic; it is the conflict that ensues from IGOs promoting liberal 
rights that concerns him. First, according to Thompson, IGOs’ promotion of liberal 
rights will inevitably lead to “reasonable disagreement” about which rights should be 
protected. He uses the reunification of Germany as an example. When East and West 
Germany reunited, East Germany guaranteed the right to an abortion, while West 
Germany protected the right to life. The second problem is that even if there is 
agreement about which rights to protect and promote, “there may be reasonable 
disagreement about the scope of its application or about what needs to be provided.”17 
To illustrate this point Thompson discusses the different interpretations by states as to 
what it means to provide acceptable levels of health care to its citizens.
It seems that with these two points Thompson is preparing to argue against 
cosmopolitanism on the grounds that it allows IGOs to enforce their will against the
,6Thompson 1999, p.l 15.
17Ibid.
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reasonable policies of democratic states. Although he will eventually argue against 
cosmopolitanism on democratic legitimacy grounds, that is not what he is contending 
at this point, however. Rather, Thompson is trying to show that cosmopolitan 
liberalism would implode if it were fully applied to the real world. But since he is 
taking this route, the whole of his argument can be distilled into a concise but 
toothless complaint: there will be reasonable disagreements between IGOs and states 
over what it means to protect and promote liberal rights.
There are four reasons why this is an unpersuasive critique of 
cosmopolitanism. First, Thompson never claims that these anticipated disagreements 
will lead to other, more pernicious, consequences. If he could show that 
disagreements between IGOs and states over the protection of liberal rights would 
lead to a decrease in their promotion, or to an increase of violence and war, then we 
would have reason to be worried. But Thompson has not shown that these or 
similarly troubling consequences follow from reasonable disagreements between 
IGOs and states.
Second, there is a fairly long history of IGOs interacting with states, yet 
Thompson illustrates his point with the intra-state example of abortion rights 
following German reunification. I take it the reason for this choice is that the kind of 
reasonable disagreement between a state and an IGO that we might find troubling 
does not often occur. In another passage, Thompson intimates that an IGO could try 
to limit health care provisions in Canada in order to illustrate how a cosmopolitan 
world order might interfere with a state’s reasonable interpretation of a basic right to
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health. But even if an IGO, say NAFTA or the UN, concluded that Canada s health 
care system were overly robust, it is hard to imagine that such an IGO would be 
concerned enough with such “over-protection” to try to impose its will. Of course, if 
Canada were providing no health care to its citizens, then we could readily imagine 
that an IGO might try to step in. Yet Thompson has already said that minimal health 
care is a basic liberty; thus, this would not be an example of the “reasonable 
disagreement” that he has in mind.18
We could shave the hypothetical closer and suppose that Canada provides 
some health care and it reasonably believes that it has met its health care obligations, 
while the governing IGO also reasonably believes that Canada ought to provide more. 
Now we have the sort of conflict that Thompson seems to have in mind. Let us 
suppose further that the IGO actually has the power to pressure compliance and 
Canada is “forced” to provide more health care.19 This leads us to the third weakness 
in Thompson’s argument: even if we concede that IGOs will compel states to change 
their reasonable beliefs on how to secure basic rights, based on liberal criteria, there 
is no problem. Yes, Canada is compelled to provide more health care than it would 
prefer, but given that the level of health care that the IGO is requiring is also a 
reasonable interpretation of the liberal right in question, then cosmopolitan 
liberalism does not implode, as the state is providing health care somewhere within
l8Ibid., pp. 114-15.
' Membership in IGOs is generally voluntary, and given that Canada could 
withdraw from participation, “forced” is probably too strong a word (although, most 
likely Thompson would not think so).
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the boundaries of what liberalism requires.
This is similar to the result in Donato Casagrande v. Landershaupstadt 
Munchen, a European Court of Justice case that troubles Thompson.20 The 
Casagrandes moved from Italy to work in Germany as migrant laborers. Some time 
after living and working in Germany, Mr. Casagrande died. Mrs. Casagrande applied 
for education grants that would help her son, Donato, continue to attend the 
Realschule in Munich. Donato’s application for low income education grants was 
denied by Munich on the grounds that the law which promises grants to low income 
school children also states that foreign students are ineligible. Rather than appeal the 
decision within the German legal system, the Casagrandes brought their case before 
the European Court of Justice. The Court -  relying on a European Council regulation 
which states that the children of citizens of other European Union states must be 
afforded the same educational opportunities as nationals -  ruled in favor of Donato.21 
Thompson is troubled by the increasing ability of IGOs to exercise authority over 
states which this case represents.22 But if Casagrande is troubling, it does not appear 
to be so on liberal rights grounds, since Donato’s receipt of education grants is well 
within parameters of liberalism.
The final reason that Thompson’s critique is not convincing is that it is not
"European Court of Justice, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshaupstadt
Munchen, Case 9/74, ECR 773, [1974] 2 CMLR 423.
2'Thompson 1999,p. 111.
22Ibid.
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clear why non-violent conflict over the meaning of rights ought not be considered a 
good to be promoted rather than an evil to be avoided. In Quebec, for example, there 
was a long standing controversy over the extent to which English should be allowed 
in public fora. The Francofones held the reasonable position that if the use of English 
were not regulated, it would destroy Quebecois culture. The Anglofones held the 
reasonable position that to overly restrict the use of English in public fora would 
discriminate against those who could not or would not speak French. This clash has 
not led to one side “winning” and the other side “losing,” but has facilitated empathy 
and an understanding of the reasons behind each side’s position. Over the decades, a 
consensus of sorts has evolved, such that most Francofones and Anglofones of 
Quebec support the current language laws.23
This type of consensus building through reasonable disagreement has also 
taken place at the international level. In the fall of 2001, for example, state 
representatives met in a WTO (an IGO) forum to discuss patent laws pertaining to 
pharmaceutical drugs. The United States entered into the deliberation taking the 
position that intellectual property rights prohibited poor countries from disregarding 
patent laws. The poor countries took the position that respecting pharmaceutical 
patent laws would prevent them from fulfilling their duties to protect the lives and 
health of their citizens. Hashing out the disagreements led to a unanimous vote of all 
member states that patent laws would be substantially relaxed in poor countries.24
:3Chambers 1996, pp. 212-227.
24New York Times, November 15, 2001.
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Thus, the reasonable disagreement fostered by the WTO led to a change that all 
parties appeared to regard as positive.
THOMPSON’S DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE OF COSMOPOLITANISM
After Thompson argues (unsuccessfully) against cosmopolitanism on liberal 
rights grounds, he then moves against it on the democracy front. His first complaint 
is that in practice the IGOs advocated by cosmopolitans tend to suffer from 
democratic deficits.25 He uses the EU as his case in point. According to Thompson, 
the EU is less than sufficiently democratic in two areas. First, the fact that the EU 
enforces policy mandates upon its democratic member states creates a democratic 
deficit. And second, the EU itself is insufficiently democratic: “This deficit shows 
up both between the EU and the member states (the EU has enacted regulations on a 
wide range of social policies without any effective electoral accountability), and with 
the structure of the government itself (the democratic Parliament has much less 
effective power than the technocratic Commission).”26
The source of both of Thompson’s concerns is the same, however. When he 
laments that “the EU has enacted regulations...  without any effective electoral 
accountability,”27 I believe that what he is actually worried about is that an IGO is 
controlling domestic policy. But of course, the fact that it does so is not an argument
25Thompson 1999, p. 115.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
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against its doing so. Thompson needs to find a reason why we ought to find this 
problematic, and the reason he provides is a lack of democratic accountability. And a 
lack of democratic accountability is the same problem he points to in his second 
complaint: “the democratic Parliament has much less effective power than the 
technocratic Commission.”28 Thus, his argument seems to be that IGOs suffer from 
democratic deficits because their decision-makers are generally not as directly 
accountable to the people as their state counterparts.
There are a few problems with this argument. First, Thompson’s use of the 
“democratic deficit” to argue against cosmopolitanism actually leaves the concept of 
IGO governance, and therefore cosmopolitanism, intact. His argument is based on 
empirical facts rather than revealing an inconsistency in theory. If cosmopolitans 
would simply change their theories to call for IGO policy makers to face regular, 
direct elections, like the EU parliamentarians, then cosmopolitanism would steer clear 
of Thompson’s objection (although, as I will contend shortly, I do not think such a 
change is necessary).
The second problem is that Thompson never shows why democratically 
elected state governments cannot use their authority to appoint politically legitimate 
representatives to IGOs. Why is it that elected state-level decision-makers can 
appoint judges, confirm cabinets, set up commissions, and in many other ways 
delegate power, yet cannot select politically legitimate representatives for IGOs? 
Perhaps some argument to this effect could be constructed (although Thompson does
28Ibid.
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not do so); but any such argument would probably have to rely on arbitrary 
distinctions between intra-state and inter-state delegative authority and to be 
compelling would also have to avoid de-legitimizing international delegations of 
authority such as treaties, international patent and trade laws, alliances, and regimes 
that coordinate basic activities such as international mail and communications 
procedures for transnational airline flights.
Let us now look critically at the supposed EU democratic deficit that 
Thompson, and others, lament.29 In the EU there are two legislative bodies -  the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union -  and one executive 
body, the European Commission.30 The members of the European Parliament are 
elected by direct universal suffrage every five years. The Council of the European 
Union is the EU’s main legislative body and members are appointed by their 
democratically elected state governments. The president and members of the 
executive branch, the European Commission, are also appointed by their 
democratically elected state governments. Moreover, members of the Commission 
must be approved by the European Paliament which, again, is directly elected by the 
citizens of EU member states. Prima facia, it seems that democratic accountability
29See, for example, Thomas Pogge. 1997. Creating Supra-National 
Institutions Democratically: Reflections on the European Union’s ‘Democratic 
Deficit. T h e  J o u r n a l o f Political Philosophy. 5: 163-82. For an argument in support 
of the EU’s democratic legitmacy, see Christopher Lord. 1998. Democracy in the 
European Union. Sheffield Academic Press: Sheffield.
30Of course there are many other bodies that make up the EU, but these are the 
ones that Thompson is concerned with. Of course there are many other bodies that 
make up the EU, but these are the ones that Thompson is concerned with.
30
permeates all three bodies in that decision-makers are either directly elected by the 
people, or are at only one remove from direct election. To convincingly attribute a 
democratic deficit to the legislative and executive branches of the EU requires more 
than reliance on common wisdom or pointing to the fact that the EU is wielding 
power in unaccustomed ways.
Another problem Thompson has with cosmopolitanism concerns a slightly 
different type of decline in democratic accountability. Thompson thinks that because 
cosmopolitans do not want a single sovereign world government, but rather multiple 
state, regional, and global political institutions, that this “multiplication of decision­
making authorities” will “by its very nature” limit the potential for citizen control.31 
Unfortunately, Thompson does not explain this assertion further. Indeed, he may be 
right that citizen influence is less than ideal in IGOs, but it is not clear why he 
concludes that it would be significantly weaker than in domestic governments. It is 
true that IGO representatives are generally, although not always, at one remove from 
direct democratic suffrage, but then so too are most domestic judicial systems, which 
often buttress democracy. If we look to the history of the civil rights movement in the 
United States, for example, much of the progress of African-American citizens was 
made possible by their access to the once removed judicial system rather than through 
direct representation.
There is another ready response to Thompson’s objection to the multiplication 
of decision-making authorities; indeed, it is one he recognizes. By creating multiple
31Thompson 1999, pp. 115-16.
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layers of governance, we might actually “generate more points of influence and more 
opportunities for participation.”32 Thompson does not reply directly to this idea, but 
instead shifts to a slightly different issue: “The dispersal of authority may generate 
more points of influence and more opportunities for participation, but it is also likely 
to offer less effective control and coordination.”33 Thus, his second problem with a 
world containing multiple decision-making authorities is that it becomes increasingly 
difficult to control and coordinate. We might have more participation but less 
governance.
Unfortunately, we again find that Thompson has provided little empirical or 
theoretical support for his assertion. If we return to Casagrande, we see that the 
potential confusion of deciding whether to go to a local, state, or regional court (the 
European Court of Justice) was not such that it prohibited Donato from receiving a 
hearing for his case. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that Munich had 
coordination problems in determining how it should go about giving Donato his 
education grants, once the ECJ ruling came down. Thompson might reply that 
Casagrande does not represent the level of coordination problems that concerns him. 
But if he has more complicated situations in mind, his argument would run into 
another difficulty.
Without international organizations, it is not clear how states could coordinate 
solutions to complicated international problems -  such as international security and
32Ibid., p. 116.
33Ibid.
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environmental collective action problems. Thompson writes, “Although 
accountability in the present system may not be robust, we can see and try to correct 
its deficiencies more clearly than we could in a system with still more sources of 
authority.” But one might reasonably reply that what robustness of accountability we 
do have in the present international system might very well be the result of current 
IGO presence. A number of international relations scholars have shown that with a 
little of the coordination, information sharing, and oversight that IGOs provide (at 
least sometimes), the payoff for inter-state cooperation increases dramatically.34 If 
states could no longer turn to IGOs for coordination, information sharing, and 
oversight, what then would become of accountability in the present system?
Thus, it seems that Thompson’s critiques of cosmopolitanism based on liberal 
rights and democratic legitimacy grounds are both unsuccessful. His critique of 
cosmopolitan liberalism is unpersuasive because he fails to demonstrate that IGO 
facilitation of free trade comes at the expense of other liberal rights, or that multiple 
layers of governance authority would lead to the types of disagreements that we 
would want to avoid, rather than encourage. Thompson’s arguments against 
cosmopolitan democracy fall short because he relies on common wisdom, rather than 
sound argument, in attributing democratic deficits to IGOs like the EU. To 
successfully attribute a democratic deficit to IGOs, Thompson should have shown
34Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane. 1993. Achieving Cooperation Under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. In Neorealism and Neoliberalism. Ed. David 
Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press; Duncan Snidal. 1991. Relative 
Gains and the Patterns of International Cooperation. American Political Science 
Review. 85: 701-26.
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why supranational delegations of authority from democratically elected state 
governments are illegitimate -  something nobody, to my knowledge, has persuasively 
done.35 And finally, there are reasons to believe that the international control and 
coordination problems that concern Thompson might actually be mitigated by 
increased IGO governance.
THOMPSON’S CRITIQUE OF CIVIL SOCIETARIANISM
Although Thompson’s critiques of cosmopolitanism are unsuccessful, his 
arguments against civil societarianism are persuasive. Advocates of civil 
societarianism, according to Thompson, want to “dissolve the tension (between 
liberty and democracy) by reducing the role of government at all levels.”36 They hope 
that various social, political, and economic public sphere discourses and non­
governmental organizations (NGOs) can pressure governments to act in ways that 
represent grass roots values. Thompson believes that these civil society solutions to 
the problems facing global society are grossly inadequate as they now stand.
First, civil societarianism suffers from the “problem of many majorities,” 
according to Thompson. This problem arises when different groups could claim to 
have democratic authority, and a theory of governance, such as civil societarianism, 
does not tell us how to decide which claims take precedence. Thompson believes that
35Furthermore, it is worth noting (although Thompson does not address the
subject), that EU voting procedures also do not appear to be prima facia 
undemocratic, if held to those standards generally applied to states.
36Thompson 1999, p. 113.
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the problem of many majorities also infects cosmopolitanism, but “civil 
societarianism suffers from the problem to an even greater degree than 
cosmopolitanism because, without denying the need for governmental institutions, it 
neglects the importance of improving and strengthening them.”37 In 
cosmopolitanism, the problem of many majorities is caused by overlapping 
authorities. In civil societarianism the problem is the want of authority. Thus, when 
one group in civil society seeks to allow economic development of a rain forest while 
another wants to conserve it and only allow recreational use, how can we 
authoritatively decide what to do?38 Obviously this problem rears its head anytime 
there is a conflict of views among the widely varied groups that constitute civil 
society.
Although Thompson does not point it out, the problem would become even 
more troubling if the conflict were between a group with decent intentions, and 
another with bad intentions, e.g. between an ethnic minority and neo-Nazis.39 
Although our preference for the former goes without saying, peaceful sentiments 
toward “other” ethnic groups are far from universally recognized in many parts of the 
world.40 Civil societarianism seems to provide no authority to arbitrate such a
37Ibid., p. 116.
38Ibid., p. 117
39See Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein. 2001. Bad Civil Society. 
Political Theory. 29: 837-865; Wapner, 1997, p. 76.
40Think of the ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Bosnia, or Indonesia, for example.
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dispute, outside o f waiting (perhaps indefinitely) for public sphere discourse to foster 
a grass-roots consensus. And even if  public sphere discourse could often lead to 
consensus on issues of importance, Thompson counters that taking action based on 
such a consensus would be politically illegitimate unless formally mandated by a 
democratic government body. This seems correct — given that many people affected 
by the outcome would not have participated in, been aware of, or consented to the 
authority o f the discourse -  but it is important to note that Thompson’s point is 
weaker than it may appear. Again, Thompson is not claiming that civil societarians 
deny the need for formal democratic governance, but that they ignore formal 
democratic institutions in their theories.41
Thompson believes that without the strong, democratically legitimate political 
institutions that civil societarians ignore, there is little hope for the rise of the robust 
civil society that they so ardently advocate. A leading civil societarian, for example, 
thinks that the creation of a strong civil society may be the solution for the manifold 
woes of troubled societies.42 Thompson disagrees: To the extent there has been 
progress in restoring law and order in Palermo, it is surely the result of the rebuilding 
not of choral societies but o f political institutions, an effort in which the notional 
government has played an important role (emphasis original). Whether formal
4'Thompson 1999, p. 116.
42Robert Putnam. 1999. M a k in g  Democracy Work. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, cited in Thompson 1999, p. 116.
43Thompson, 1999, p. 116.
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political institutions causally precede robust civil society or vice versa, may be a bit of 
a chicken versus egg argument. But if formal institutions do in fact precede robust 
civil society, or even if the truth lies, as it so often does, somewhere on the middle 
ground, then Thompson is correct in concluding that civil societarians need to explain 
what types o f formal political institutions fit into their theories of domestic and global 
governance.
THOMPSON’S ADVOCACY OF DELIBERATIVE STATES
Thompson believes that states are the best venue from which to provide global 
governance because for the foreseeable future they are likely to remain the most 
important players in world politics, despite increasing levels of globalization.44 
Nevertheless, Thompson believes that globalizing forces have significant effects and 
“probably make it harder for [state] governments to tax capital and to spend more 
resources on social programs.” But he also thinks that “it is easy to exaggerate the 
effects on the autonomy o f domestic governments.. .  The most reliable recent studies 
show that the effects of international capital mobility are ‘contingent on the choices of 
national policymakers’ and their domestic institutions.”45 Thompson concludes that 
“what may seem to be a loss of domestic control is actually the result of ‘self-limited 
sovereignty.’”46
^Ibid., p. 118.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
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Although scholars fall on both sides of this debate, there is much empirical 
support for Thompson’s position that states maintain significant levels of sovereignty 
despite economic globalization.47 In his critiques of cosmopolitanism and civil 
societarianism, however, Thompson is concerned that these views do not address 
(persuasively) how global economic pressures can be reined in.48 Yet Thompson does 
not claim that deliberative states could any better control the global economic 
pressures themselves (although he does discuss how they would seek morally 
justifiable trade agreements); thus, Thompson is applying a markedly higher standard 
of retaining sovereignty to cosmopolitanism and civil societariansim than he is to his 
deliberative states.
Even though Thompson does not tackle the bigger questions of economic 
globalization, he does argue that deliberative states could make domestic and 
international politics more fair, while mitigating the “problem of many majorities.”49 
First, Thompson believes that the political decisions made by deliberative 
democracies would be fair because “laws and policies imposed on individuals must be 
justified to them in terms that they can reasonably accept.”50 He finds this a fairer,
47See Stephen Krasner. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Garrett, 1998.
48Thompson 1999, pp. 114-18.
49As the reader will recall, this the problem of more than one group being able 
to claim democratic authority, and a theory of governance does not tell us which
claim takes precedence.
50Thompson 1999, p. 120.
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and a more moral way of making political decisions because justifications “are not 
merely procedural (‘because the majority favors it’) or purely substantive (‘because it 
is a human right’). They appeal to moral principles.. .  that individuals who are 
motivated to find fair terms of cooperation can actually accept” (emphasis mine).51
Thompson also thinks that state-level deliberative democracies would improve
global society by broadening political accountability: “Public officials must consider
not only their electoral constituents but a lso .. .  their moral constituents, all those
individuals who are bound by the decisions they make, whether de jure or de facto”
(emphasis original).52 Thus, state self-interest would be replaced to some extent by
genuine attempts to do what is best for all moral constituents. And, he thinks, this
would result in domestic policy makers’ finding common ground between different
groups (including foreign groups), which would greatly mitigate the “problem of
many majorities” by decreasing the frequency with which conflicts arise.
Furthermore, the ideal of accountability suggests institutional changes:
The broadened accountability in deliberative democracy suggests some institutional 
changes. For example, a state could establish forums in which representatives could 
speak for the ordinary citizens of foreign states, presenting their claims and 
responding to counter-claims of representatives of the host state. The responsibility 
could even be formalized by establishing a special office-a kind of Tribune for non­
citizens.53
Thompson believes that bringing states closer to deliberative ideals in this manner
51Ibid.
52Ibid.
53Ibid.,pp. 121-122.
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would have a number of salutary effects, ranging from better conditions for guest 
workers to improved economic negotiations between states (which he thinks are 
unjustly biased towards the commercial interests, rather than those of labor, or the 
environment).54
Unfortunately, Thompson’s explanation of exactly who ought to be considered
a “moral constituent” disappoints. The concept sounds radically expansive when he
defines the moral constituency of policy makers as “all those individuals who are
bound by the decisions they [policy makers] make, whether de jure or de facto.”55 But
his further explanation o f this concept shows that it is quite limited:
This moral constituency goes beyond the borders of the nation, but stops short of a 
cosmopolitan inclusion of everyone in the world who might be affected by a state’s 
decision. It goes beyond the borders because non-citizens are sometimes bound by 
the state’s decisions, such as those involving immigration, import restrictions and 
transnational environmental agreements. It stops short of including everyone who 
may be affected because most non-citizens are not reasonably regarded as participants 
in the scheme o f cooperation that establishes the rights and obligations that the state 
enforces (emphasis mine).56
Thus, Thompson’s moral constituency consists only of those who can be regarded as 
participants in a “scheme of cooperation.” But what exactly constitutes Thompson’s 
scheme of cooperation?57 As he states, it is more restrictive than simply being
54Ibid.
55Ibid.,p. 120.
56Ibid.
57Due to the complexities of the concept, and scant explication by Thompson, 
a full and complete answer to this question would take more space and attention than 
I can give in this essay.
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affected by a law or policy. Perhaps he has in mind some type of international 
agreement that binds states and peoples together. But if this is required, would not 
many of the people most in need of consideration go unconsidered? Even under a 
very loose interpretation of what constitutes a morally binding scheme of cooperation, 
Somalia, Rwanda, and North Korea, for example, would likely have few if any 
schemes of cooperation; thus, their citizens would often only be the moral 
constituents of their own troubled governments.
Deliberative state policy makers considering their moral constituents would 
certainly be an improvement on state self-interest policy making discourses, but if 
Thompson is trying to address the challenges facing global society, and schemes of 
cooperation are indeed important to creating moral constituencies, then perhaps he 
ought to have considered the schemes of cooperation found in IGOs; and he ought to 
have explored what might follow if IGOs became more deliberative and their policy 
makers took into account their moral constituents. Peoples that are suffering would 
likely slip through the cracks under Thompson’s state-level approach, but because of 
the many regional and global IGO schemes of cooperation all peoples would likely be 
moral constituents for a number of different IGOs.58 Furthermore, if the concept of 
moral constituents were taken seriously in IGOs, then the problem of many majorities 
(if it is a problem) would be mitigated for the same reasons that it would be mitigated
,8Although, taking the requirement for schemes of cooperation seriously 
would mean that all people would not be moral constituents for the policy makers of 
every IGO. But even so, it seems likely that virtually every person would be protected 
as a moral constituent by a web of different IGOs.
41
in drhhcraitte tfatc*
I also suggests Mate-level institutional changes that might include a
I rtbuftc toe m*n-v m/cn» I his may in (act be a good way to allow state policy 
makm to the penpcclivc* of foreign peoples, but it is hard to imagine that
such a tribune Mould be given mure than token power. Would not foreign peoples be 
better represented if the) had real power in international institutions? Some would 
argue that it it utopian to believe that a poor state will ever wield influence equal to 
that of a powerful slate in an 1(H). This may be true, but in IGOs less powerful states 
do bring some amount of constitutionally mandated real power to the table that can be 
used to make their voiccs heard, to vote, or to parlay with other similarly situated 
stain to create a more formidable voting bloc.'-’ Is not this be a better formula than a 
state-level tribune for making sure that more perspectives are actually considered?
Or. better yet. why not combine the benefits of deliberative states in conjunction with 
those of improved deliberative IGOs?
O f course, if Thompson were an international relations realist and thought that 
IGOs did not actually have significant amounts o f power, then his ignoring what 
might follow if IGOs were brought closer to deliberative ideals would be 
understandable. But rhompson is not a realist and he does think that IGOs have 
power. Consider his reaction to the ( usagruntie case discussed earlier. I hompson is
’’’Thompson 1999. p. 122.
“*Scc Arend l.ijphart. 196.1. The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General 
Assembly. A m e r i c a n  Political Science Review. 57: 902-17.
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d e e p l y  troubled by Casagrande: “Embedded in this case are the key elements of the 
problems that globalization poses for both liberalism and democracy” (emphasis 
mine).61 Thompson believes that IGOs, such as the European Court of Justice, are 
actually able to impose their will on states (even though they lack the liberal right and 
democratic authority to do so).62 Furthermore, Thompson believes that the informal 
structures of globalization, such as NGOs and transnational corporations (TNCs), are 
also wielding worrying levels of influence on international and domestic political and 
social processes.63 Thus, since Thompson does believe that supranational structures 
have real power, it is surprising that he did not consider how they might be made 
more deliberative, democratic, and legitimate.
Nevertheless, Thompson does make slight room for IGOs: “To reaffirm the 
importance of the state is not to deny the need for transnational democracy, or to 
privilege the state as the only site of liberal democracy.”64 But when it comes down to 
specifics, in Thompson’s world the main role of IGOs would be to provide
61Thompson 1999, p. 111.
62A realist, on the other hand, would likely respond to Casagrande with 
indifference: if  the ruling changed something of significance then Germany would 
have resisted compliance; otherwise, not. A second possible realist interpretation of 
Casagrande is that the ruling did indeed damage Germany (it sent a signal of 
weakness to actual and potential adversaries), but Germany was in fact too weak to 
resist. Even under this interpretation of the events surrounding the Casagrande case, 
the key variable is not the presence of an international court (as Thompson seems to 
lament), but rather the power, or lack thereof, of a nation-state.
“ Thompson 1999, p. 113.
“ Ibid., p. 118.
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information and advice to state policy makers: “Processes could be designed to 
encourage [state-level] representatives to take into account the views of transnational 
agencies and organizations.”65 This small role for IGOs is too limited. Many of 
today’s troubling problems are of global scope and if left to deliberative states to 
solve (with IGOs playing only an advisory role) there will likely be a tragedy of the 
commons of literally global proportion.66 In his advocacy of a state-level approach to 
international governance, Thompson fails to address this well worn yet all-too-urgent 
theme. Neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists, and even realists recognize that 
regardless of their best intentions, states cannot, on their own, escape the collective 
action problems of the anarchical international system.67 Thus, Thompson’s state- 
level approach to global governance suffers from a problem similar to the one he 
rightly attributed to civil societarianism. Civil societarians nod their heads toward 
democratic political institutions, but do not systematically search out and explore 
exactly what those institutions ought to look like and how large a role they should 
play in global society. Thompson nods his head toward IGOs, but never explores 
what might make them more deliberative, democratic, and politically legitimate. In 
short, Thompson looks at states as they could be, but at IGOs as they are.
65Ibid„ p. 122.
^Keohane 1984, 2001.
67Realists, of course, hold that even with the assistance o f IGOs, states cannot 
escape the Hobbesian difficulties of the anarchical international system. See Kenneth 
Waltz. 1979. Theory o f  International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley; John 
Mearsheimer. 1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International 
Security. 19: 5-49.
44
CONCLUSION
Thompson’s arguments for global governance by deliberative states are novel 
but, as I have argued, a world governed by deliberative states is not a sufficient 
solution to the problems facing global society. Nevertheless, Thompson does make 
important contributions to the literature of global governance. The state-level 
deliberative reforms he suggests would certainly provide some welcome benefits to 
global society. In addition, without dismissing the governance potential of global 
civil society, Thompson shows persuasively the need for civil societarians to better 
explain the role of formal political institutions in their theories. Moreover, I also 
believe Thompson is right to point out that states are still the major players in world 
politics. Yet being the major players does not mean that all, or even most, global 
governance will need to flow directly from state institutions, as Thompson has 
assumed.
In this chapter I have tried to show that IGOs are crucial components to 
achieving global governance and they should not be dismissed for the liberal and 
democratic reasons Thompson cites. But this is not to say that political theorists and 
philosophers should not look for ways to improve IGO structures and procedures. In 
fact, I believe that if implemented in IGOs, many of Thompson’s suggestions for 
state-level deliberative reforms would greatly benefit the supranational-level of 
governance. But, that said, it seems apparent that even improved, deliberative IGOs 
would not reach their full potential for global governance unless complimented by 
domestic institutions and policy makers that have also moved closer to deliberative
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ideals. In conclusion, if the arguments in this chapter are for the most part correct, 
then theorists of global governance should explore more fully how the roles of 
deliberative states, global civil society, and IGOs might be combined to provide a 
more comprehensive account of democratic global governance.
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Chapter 3
A Critical Analysis of John Dryzek’s Account of Transnational Democracy
In his latest book, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, John Dryzek 
proposes that democratic global governance can be achieved through critical 
discourse within global civil society.1 Rather than building on the growing literature 
of cosmopolitanism, which advocates empowering democratically reformed 
international governmental organizations (IGOs), Dryzek argues that increasingly 
powerful IGOs-such as the UN, EU, and the WTO-ought to be resisted. The ensuing 
governance vacuum could then be filled by global civil society. Specifically, he 
advocates governance through “discourse networks” within global civil society. A 
discourse network is created when various non-governmental groups and individuals 
come together to discuss a particular concern, combining their unique strands of 
discourse (“nodes”) into a unified, more powerful whole. Dryzek believes that the 
communicative power of a number of such networks, cutting across traditional nation­
state spaces of governance, could bring about democratic global order. Dryzek 
articulates reasons for believing what is often only assumed in the literature of global 
civil society: that IGOs are irredeemably undemocratic, and that civil society, on its 
own. is capable of providing global democratic governance. Because Dryzek has the 
best developed theory to date of how civil society could deliver global democratic 
order, a careful analysis of his ideas is needed. In this chapter. I will argue that the
'Dryzek 2000.
47
reasons Dryzek forwards for holding IGOs as undemocratic are, in the end, 
unpersuasive; and that the discourse networks he advocates in lieu of formal IGO 
governance, might themselves suffer from democratic deficits.
IGOs AND ANARCHY
Dryzek begins his arguments against cosmopolitanism by pointing out that 
there are no global states or state analogues in the international system and therefore 
“it makes more sense to examine the possibilities for democratization in connection 
with discursive sources of order already present in the international system.”2 
Dryzek’s contention here consists of two closely related points. First, the ideal of 
cosmopolitan government is so distant from the reality of our world that it is too 
utopian to serve as a guide. And second, because the core elements of discourse 
networks are already present in the international system, prima facia we ought to 
prefer discursive governance to cosmopolitanism.
Cosmopolitans, like David Held, suggest that all formal governmental 
organization, from the local to the global, should eventually be a part of a governing 
hierarchy. Such universal government power, Dryzek notes, does not presently exist, 
and “any attempt to introduce such mechanisms faces an uphill struggle.”3 This is an 
understatement. Indeed, one might say that as cosmopolitan theories are currently 
articulated, the realization of their ideals would require a systemic change of global
2Ibid., p. 115.
3Ibid.
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proportion. Alexander Wendt famously asserted that “anarchy is what states make of 
it.”4 Even though cosmopolitans like Held reject the idea of a world state, their ideal 
IGOs appear to be strong enough that their realization would mean that international 
anarchy would no longer “be what states make of it,” but would disappear altogether. 
Cosmopolitans understand that change will take place gradually, but at some point the 
essential nature of the international system would have to change radically from 
anarchical to governed; and the possibility of this change, given its unprecedented 
magnitude, deserves more explanation than has been given.
Although Dryzek is correct that the feasability of cosmopolitan ideals is 
problematic, he fails to acknowledge that there is still space for IGO governance short 
of ending international anarchy. Dryzek mistakenly assumes that because fully 
achieving cosmopolitan ideals is unlikely, moving toward those ideals would not 
improve democratic global governance. This seems unfair, given that Dryzek’s 
discursive sources of order would also only mitigate, rather than end, international 
anarchy. In addition, it is true that the inchoate elements of Dryzek’s proposed 
discourse networks are already present in the international system, but so too are 
cosmopolitan sources of order. Certainly IGOs have yet to achieve the practical 
significance or democratic deepening that cosmopolitans seek. Nevertheless, IGOs 
are present and they do affect our world.5
4Wendt 1992.
5See Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist 
Theory. International Security. 20 (1): 39-51; Snidal 1991; Wendt 1992; Peter 
Singer. 2002. One World: The Ethics o f Globalization. New Haven: Yale
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By downplaying the governance potential of IGOs, Dryzek is trying to show 
that critical discourse networks are the only realistic hope for transnational 
democracy: “[Critical] deliberative democracy should be more at home in the 
international system than liberal aggregative models of democracy, though only so 
long as it can escape liberal constitutionalism, because there are no constitutions 
worth speaking of in the international system.”6 This last assertion is surprising, 
given that Dryzek believes that IGOs like the WTO, UN, and the EU exercise 
significant influence in the international system. Thus, it is unclear why he would not 
want the ideals of deliberative democracy to inform their constitutions, especially if 
he is right (although I do not think he is) that as they now operate, they are “not at all 
democratic.”7
IGO’s AND DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY
The utopianism that really troubles Dryzek is not the belief that IGOs will 
develop significant power in the future, but the belief that powerful IGOs can become 
democratic. Dryzek finds this utopian because he thinks that the IGOs of today are so 
thoroughly undemocratic. He supports this contention in several ways. First, Dryzek 
argues that states do not behave in democratically accountable ways when it comes to 
foreign policy decisions, therefore a state’s decision to participate in an IGO is
University Press.
6Dryzek 2000, p. 116.
7Ibid., p. 138.
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undemocratic.8 Second, IGOs are themselves “not at all democratic.”9 Third, IGOs, 
in practice, simply facilitate economic market liberalism, and thereby limit the policy­
making space available for democratic discourse.10 And finally, Dryzek argues that 
international security IGOs are dangerous to democracy when introduced into a world 
characterized by gross inequalities in power.11 Let us take a critical look at each of his 
concerns.
Dryzek contends that the foreign policy decisions of states, including
decisions to participate in IGOs, are undemocratic, based on the security concerns of
executive, not legislative, branches of government:
Yet even here we know that foreign policy is the main area where ‘reason of 
state’ override democratic decision-making, and that it is likely to be foreign 
ministries and the executive branch of government that play the major role in 
negotiations... such that state democracy cannot be allowed to impede the 
overarching survival imperative.12
Although realists would concur with this portrayal, many scholars within other
traditions of international relations thought would dissent, including the one with
which Dryzek aligns himself, “sustainable development.”13 Indeed, it seems just as
plausible to believe that “reason of the state” is not often used to thwart the will of the
8Ibid., p. 116.
9Ibid.,p. 138
I0Ibid.
"Ibid. p. 119.
I2Ibid., p. 116.
13Ibid., pp. 122-3.
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people, especially in established democratic states. And, even if suspended because 
of security concerns, the will of the demos cannot be put off indefinitely. The “rally 
around the flag” effect is notoriously short-lived, for example.
Moreover, why are security concerns necessarily undemocratic, particularly in 
times of crisis or war? Dryzek points to the fact that executive branches generally 
make foreign policy decisions, but why should this be considered undemocratic? At 
the founding of the United States, for example, there was much discourse and debate 
concerning the best distribution of constitutional powers.14 Was the eighteenth 
century will of the American people undemocratic because they did not choose to 
place the bulk of foreign policy powers in the legislative branch? If so, then it is 
peculiar that in no established democracy today is there any significant popular 
movement to take foreign policy decisions out of the executive branch and put them 
into the hands of the legislative.
And let us not forget that in democratic states executive branches are also, to 
greater or lesser degree, democratically accountable.15 Executive foreign policy 
decisions are informed and limited by the culture and discourse of the public sphere,
14For a discussion of the level of debate surrounding the founding of the 
United States, see Bruce Ackerman. 1991. We the People: Foundations. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
15In the US, not only are presidents limited to two, four year terms of service, 
but they also have a much lower re-election rate than do members of the House and 
Senate.
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for example.16 Furthermore, if Dryzek were correct that foreign policy decisions are 
dictated by security imperatives that fall beyond the democratic will, then we would 
expect that democracies and non-democracies would behave identically. Yet there is 
of course a large and compelling literature documenting the “democratic peace.”17 
Indeed, Jack Levy asserts that “the absence of war between democracies comes as 
close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”18 Thus, it 
appears we need not assume, with Dryzek, that foreign policy decisions, including 
state choices to participate in IGOs, are generally undemocratic.
IGOs AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS
Not only is Dryzek worried that states decide to participate in IGOs for 
undemocratic reasons, he is also concerned that IGOs are themselves undemocratic. 
The WTO, for example, has absolutely “no democratic features,” according to 
Dryzek.19 The WTO’s decision-making procedure appears to be prima facia 
democratic, however. Framing arguments in a way that would allow for a consensus
16See Miroslav Nincic. 1992. Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy o f  
Political Realism. New York: Columbia University Press.
17For a summary of the ideological and empirical arguments for and against 
the democratic peace, see Steve Chan. In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and 
Promise. Mershon International Studies Review. 41: 59-91; Michael Brown, S. 
Lynn-Jones and S. Miller. 1996. Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge: MIT 
Press.
18Jack Levy. 1988. Domestic Politics and War. Journal o f Interdisciplinary
History. 18 (4): 653-73.
19Dryzek 2000, p. 119.
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is considered by Habermas, Rawls, Manin, and other democratic thinkers to be an 
important element of democratic discourse, for example, and as an institutional matter 
the WTO only takes action once a consensus has been reached.20 What better way to 
insure that deliberation is framed in terms to which all participants could agree than to 
in fact require all participants to agree? Nevertheless, some political thinkers do not 
think that enabling or achieving consensus is necessary for democratic political 
action. In fact, some believe that seeking consensus gives too much weight to the 
status quo.21 Yet even these critics generally do not argue that seeking consensus is 
patently undemocratic.
An argument could be made that it matters little how closely an organization 
approximates deliberative and democratic procedural ideals if the participants 
themselves are not democratic. Iran, for example, has been trying to gain entrance 
into the WTO since 1996. The US has consistently blocked Iran’s entrance through 
the power, given to every state in the WTO, to veto any proposal.22 Is the US’s veto a 
democratic move? Most deliberative democrats do not hold that an organization has 
to be democratic to participate in domestic democratic processes. Instead, political
20Jurgen Habermas. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
Transl. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 
John Rawls. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press; 
Bernard Manin 1987.
2‘See Amy Gutman. 1999. The Epistemic Theory of Democracy Revisited.
In Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights. Eds. Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald 
C. Slye. New Haven: Yale University Press; Peter Singer, 2002.
22New York Times, October, 11,2001.
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parties, tribal governments, and religious organizations are welcomed. It may be that 
democratic participation requirements should be more exclusive once we move to an 
international level of governance, although Dryzek does not take this position.
Rather, Dryzek is worried that IGOs are already too exclusive.23 Although he thinks 
the some UN agencies with a “social” mission are appropriately inclusive (such as 
UNICEF, and the Human Rights Commission of the UN), Dryzek believes that the 
most powerful IGOs -  and their influential branches, such as the UN Security Council 
-  are all problematically exclusive.24 Dryzek divides exclusivity into two types, 
active and passive. No IGOs are actively exclusive in trying to curtail the role of 
groups in global civil society by working toward their demise (even when these 
groups are actively working against IGOs). Nevertheless, powerful IGOs are guilty of 
passive exclusion, which occurs when IGOs do not foster the growth of, or share their 
influence with, the actors of global civil society.25
It is not clear why IGOs need to share their power with civil society groups to 
be democratic, however. When discussing civil society groups, Dryzek never 
mentions that these groups should share their power with IGOs, or even with their 
less powerful counterparts. Perhaps Dryzek never calls on civil society actors to share 
their power because they have so little, while IGOs have so much. But Dryzek 
recognizes that there are many weak IGOs that have democratic potential yet little
23Dryzek 2000, pp. 135-38.
24Ibid.,p. 137.
25Ibid., pp. 135-38.
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power.26 Should not these democratic yet weak IGOs also be given more power? If 
not by civil society actors, then by powerful IGOs? Furthermore, when Dryzek 
discusses his ideal of transnational governance, he envisions powerful discourse 
networks, yet never mentions that these newly empowered entities would need to 
share their power with other formal or informal organizations.
Even when a powerful IGO does make efforts to incorporate civil society 
groups, Dryzek does not change his opinion of their undemocratic nature. Consider 
the World Bank. Over the past twenty years the World Bank has made increasing 
efforts to work with civil society groups to inform, improve and implement its 
policies. In the 1970s and early 1980's, the World Bank was relatively isolated from 
civil society actors. By 1992, of the 156 projects that the World Bank undertook, 89 
incorporated cooperation with NGOs.27 And since James Wolfensohn became 
president of the World Bank in 1995, the already increasing participation from civil 
society has increased even more rapidly.28 Alongside these changes, the substantive 
content of World Bank projects and policies have increasingly encouraged democratic 
values by requiring wider participation, greater transparency, and more accountability 
in the institutions of recipient states.29 Thus, Dryzek’s conclusion that the World
26Ibid.,p. 137.
27Robert O’Brien, A. M. Goetz, J. A. Scholte, and M. Williams. 2000. 
Contesting Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 30.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
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Bank, along with other powerful IGOs, is “not at all democratic” is somewhat 
surprising, especially since he is aware that such changes are taking place: “The 
World Bank, long excoriated for the environmentally abusive projects it financed, did 
by the 1990s open an environmental department and appoint environmentalists to
it.”30
Maybe Dryzek believes that the reforms of the World Bank are only partial, 
and therefore not an example of a powerful, yet democratic IGO.31 But perhaps 
Dryzek is not truly considering the power sharing taking place in the World Bank or 
the consensus voting procedures in the WTO. It may be that Dryzek simply sees 
powerful IGOs as hindrances to his preferred sites of transnational governance, 
discourse networks. And because Dryzek advocates sites of power that are critical of 
the status quo and established power, it may be the case that powerful IGOs will never 
be considered democratic by Dryzek, as they tend buttress more traditional 
conceptions of political and economic power.
IGOs, DEMOCRACY, AND FREE TRADE
Dryzek believes that many of the most powerful IGOs are simply “economic 
police officers,” and given their role as such, “There is again little evidence of 
democracy here.”32 In order to evaluate Dryzek’s assessment, let us look closely at
30Dryzek 2000, p. 136.
3IIbid., p. 137.
32Ibid., p. 116.
57
the source of his complaints. Dryzek states, “The danger in establishing 
governmental bodies with an economic mandate at the international level is that they 
will be subject to the economic constraints on states, and so reproduce those limits to 
democracy at an international level.”33 To which limits is Dryzek referring? He 
writes, “The first task of all states with capitalist economies is maintenance of the 
confidence of actual and potential investors.”34 Dryzek does not view this role of 
states as a positive one for democracy. He thinks it is bad enough that democratic 
states act to promote economic growth at the expense of other worthwhile projects, 
but even worse that IGOs help states achieve this aim.
Let us examine the two GATT examples Dryzek uses to illustrate how the 
economic liberalism promoted by IGOs can thwart democracy. First, in 1991, the 
GATT (which has since been reformed to create the WTO), ruled that an American 
ban on tuna imports caught using methods that kill high numbers of dolphins was a 
violation of GATT trade agreements. The second example is the GATT’s rejection of 
Indonesia’s ban on raw log exports (in an effort to maintain sustainable forestry in its 
country).35 Adding to Dryzek’s unease over these ruling is that IGOs such as the 
GATT have the power to punish states that do not abide by their rulings. There are a 
number of issues here which need to be sorted out in the next two sections. Here I 
begin by asking, are the two GATT rulings in these examples simply unwise and
33Ibid.,p. 119.
34Ibid.
35Ibid., p. 127.
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unfortunate decisions? Or, are they unwise, unfortunate, and undemocratic 
decisions?
In the two GATT cases that concern Dryzek, it seems that the decisions to 
protect neither dolphins nor sustainable forestry are indeed unwise and unfortunate. 
Dryzek believes that these decisions are also undemocratic, but it is not clear how this 
necessarily follows, unless he assumes that truly democratic decisions can never be 
egregiously mistaken. If a well-informed demos can make troubling mistakes, then 
perhaps Dryzek’s objections are really grounded in a substantive view of justice, 
rather than democracy. Dryzek claims this is not his intention, however; so how 
exactly is he reaching the conclusion that the GATT decisions are undemocratic? 
Dryzek argues that the democratic deficits of economic liberal IGOs have their roots 
in the undemocratic limits of domestic politics: “The first task of all states with 
capitalist economies is maintenance of the confidence of actual and potential 
investors.”36 But this seems overstated; certainly there are other tasks of equal or 
greater importance that states perform: maintaining law and order, national security, 
and democratic institutions, even at the expense of investors, for example. If doing 
what is best for investment is primary, then why do we not see a world populated with 
“Sri Lankan” governments that greatly curtail public sphere discourse and private 
liberties in order to attract capital?
The portrait Dryzek paints of the state as a unified, rational actor seeking to 
fulfill an agreed upon economic goal is overly simplistic. Sometimes attracting
36Ibid.
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investment dollars is a top priority, but at other times different interests come to the 
fore, including the many special interests of influential groups. Why is it that the US 
spends more (as a percentage of GDP) on its military than does France, for example? 
Is it because the US leaders calculate that such a large military budget would do more 
to help attract investment dollars? This explanation seems less plausible than that a 
military industrial complex is better established in the US than in France (partly due 
to the travails of the French military in WWII), and is therefore able to gamer more 
funding. Why is it that Clinton did, and Reagan and Bush Sr. did not heed the advise 
of Allan Greenspan, and make real efforts to balance the budget? Is it because prior 
to Clinton such a measure would not have significantly increased investors’ 
confidence? Or is it because in a democracy the goals of the leadership change? 
Domestic politics is complicated and to assume that a state is a unified actor pursuing 
one primary common goal is often much too simple.37
Even though Dryzek overstates the importance attracting investment dollars, 
certainly a strong economy is one component of a healthy state; and to attain a strong 
economy a state generally has to accept certain economic constraints. In The Lexus 
and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman refers to these economic constraints as a 
“golden straight jacket.”38 The straightjacket does not require uniformity, as might be
37See for example Allison’s description of the competing domestic interests 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis; Grahm Allison. 1971. The Essence of Decision. 
Boston: Little Brown.
38Thomas Friedman. 2000. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: 
Anchor Books.
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thought, however. There is policy space for more (Sweden) or less (the US) wealth 
redistribution, for example, although in both cases the straightjacket requires 
economic discipline. States cannot simply print more money to get out of debt or 
default on loan re-payments if they want investors to keep their assets in the state.
Similar to Thomas Friedman’s “golden straightjacket” is Benjamin Cohen’s 
idea of “the unholy trinity” of political economy. Cohen argues that to avoid capital 
flight and economic decline, state governments can control any two of the three basic 
fiscal elements -  exchange rates, capital mobility, and monetary policy — but must 
take a hands off approach and allow markets to determine the third.39 If Friedman and 
Cohen are correct that states must exercise economic discipline to prosper, is this 
prima facia undemocratic?40 It does not seem so, especially since most citizens have 
a strong interest in a healthy, growing economy.41 And if not, then the fact that some 
IGOs facilitate such agendas is not a reason to dismiss cosmopolitanism as 
undemocratic. But before we put too much weight on the interests of the demos we 
ought to make sure we know which group of people constitutes the relevant public. 
This leads us to the tension between global and local constituencies.
39Benjamin Cohen. 1995. The Triad and the Unholy Trinity. In International 
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. Eds. Jeffry Frieden 
and David Lake. New York: St. Martins Press.
40This is not to dismiss the possibility that there are more and less democratic 
ways of exercising economic discipline.
41Mancur Olson 1982.
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THE GLOBAL VERSUS THE LOCAL
Implicit and occasionally explicit in many of Dryzek’s arguments is a concern 
that IGOs overturn local democratic will. Dryzek paints a picture of citizens deciding 
what is in their best interest through discourse and deliberation, only to have their 
democratic resolve frustrated by powerful IGOs. Obviously, such unfortunate 
scenarios need to be addressed, but Dryzek goes a step further and argues that because 
IGOs over-rule local constituencies, they are undemocratic and should be replaced 
with other means of governance. For his position to be compelling, Dryzek would 
have to show that IGOs are themselves undemocratic, however: something he has not 
done. After all, if IGOs are democratically legitimate then implementing their 
policies would not be inherently undemocratic. And when an IGO overrides a local 
democratic will, if we consider both wills to have democratic authority then deciding 
which level of governance ought to take precedence would require a more developed 
theory of when a global public should defer to a local public.
It seems that we are once again faced with what Dennis Thompson calls, “the 
problem of many majorities.” The reader will recall that the problem of many 
majorities occurs when multiple publics claim to have democratic authority yet a 
theory of governance does not tell us (compellingly) which claim ought to take 
precedence. Like a holographic image, the constituency of significance changes 
depending on the angle from which one views the problem. From one perspective, a 
situation may look problematic because domestic will is being over-ruled by an IGO. 
But, as in the case of the US facilitation of dolphin safe tuna, perhaps our judgement
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is influenced by the subject matter. Recently the US refused to sign the Kyoto 
Protocol, which would have required a pledge to lower US production of greenhouse 
gasses. Suppose an IGO had the power to pressure compliance, would this be 
undemocratic? In this case, we might reasonably conclude that the US is behaving 
undemocratically because the majority of states, including the US, recognize that 
global green house gasses need to be decreased. Thus it would not seem inherently 
undemocratic for an IGO to help bring about consensus and compliance on the Kyoto 
Protocol.
It does not appear that we should accept unqualifiedly Dryzek’s preference for
the local over the global. When global and local publics disagree about how to handle
issues such as free trade, dolphin-safe tuna, or the Kyoto protocol, we need guidance
for which is the appropriate level of governance, unless we are willing to take a
substantive justice approach to global governance and determine the appropriate
public based on the likelihood of achieving a preferred policy outcome. Perhaps the
principle of subsidiarity could serve as a guide:
The European Union is a federal body that has adopted the principle that 
decisions should always be taken at the lowest level capable of dealing with 
the problem. The application of this principle, known as subsidiarity, is still 
being tested. But if it works for Europe, it is not impossible that it might work 
for the rest of the world.42
Certainly subsidiarity is not without difficulties, but it seems a more fruitful starting
point than Dryzek’s blanket rejection of the global in favor of the local.
42Peter Singer, 2002, pp. 119-200. See also Held 1995, pp. 235-37.
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IGOs, PUNISHMENT, AND COERCION
Dryzek’s preference for local governance makes him concerned with IGOs’ 
ability to punish noncompliance. Dryzek does not fully consider that states have the 
option to leave if they feel they are being treated unfairly by IGOs, however.
Certainly exit will come at a cost, but, I will argue, this fact should not change our 
evaluation of IGOs’ democratic legitimacy: especially when we consider that the 
“punishment” for noncompliance is generally limited to a suspension or termination 
of participation benefits.43
When an IGO makes a decision that a member-state strongly disagrees with, 
the state is faced with a decision: love it or leave it. We rightly cringe at “love it or 
leave it” as a basis for domestic political obligation because there is little or no choice 
of where one is bom, where one’s friends and families reside, one’s native tongue, or 
the culture and land one comes to think of as home.44 Giving these up is an 
unreasonably demanding condition of repudiating one’s allegiance. Furthermore, 
states are also demanding in that they enforce laws that not all agree with, they 
sometimes ask citizens to give their lives on the battlefield, and they require payments 
of a significant percentage of citizens’ earnings. And if one wanted to get away from
43It is often said that IGOs are simply the tools of powerful states, but this 
must not, at least always, be the case. The US withdrew its participation from an IGO 
(the International Labor Organization) because it did not believe it was being treated 
fairly, for example.
44See John Simmons. 1983. On the Edge o f Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and 
the Limits o f Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press; George Klosko. 1998. 
Fixed Content of Political Obligation. Political Studies. 46 (1): 53-67; H.L.A. Hart. 
1965. The Concept o f Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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all obligations to states, there are few or no places to go. The reasons that make “love 
it or leave it” unacceptably coercive as a basis of domestic political obligation are not 
present between a state and an IGO, however. Many states have survived and some 
have even prospered without participating in the powerful free market IGOs that 
concern Dryzek. It may be the case that participation in such IGOs is necessary in 
order to reach the highest echelons of development and prosperity, but such reward 
incentives are hardly the same as coercive threats.45
Dryzek might respond that the existence of free market IGOs creates pressures 
that are nonetheless damaging to the project of transnational democracy. Is this right? 
Consider five democratic states, A, B, C, D, and E. Let us say that C, D, and E create 
an IGO to enforce a free trade zone, and C, D, and E begin to grow economically at 
faster rates than A and B, which have chosen not to participate. Let us suppose 
further that A and B are actually worse off because of the existence of the free trade 
IGO; investment dollars are leaving A and B and going to C, D, and E because of 
their higher economic growth rates. Would it be more democratic to declare that no 
states can participate in such free trade agreements? What would be the specific 
democratic complaints against C, D, and E? Should it be considered a democratic 
violation to make states overly attractive to investors?
What if C, D, and E’s free trade regime had backfired and their economies 
slipped into recession while A and B’s economies continued to grow at a modest rate, 
causing investment dollars to flow out of C, D, and E and into A and B? Would C, D,
45See Hart 1965; Simmons 1993.
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and E then have a democratic complaint against A and B? If in the original example 
we think that A and B have a democratically legitimate complaint against C, D, and 
E, but in the second example we do not think C, D, and E have a democratic 
complaint against A and B, how could we justify this position? We might say that the 
more protectionist economies of A and B were the status quo, and therefore C, D, and 
E have little room to complain in the second case because they chose to deviate from 
status quo. But why should the status quo be relevant to democratic legitimacy? If 
we say that C, D, and E were not forced to join a free trade regime in the second 
example, we might also point out that in the first example A and B chose to not 
participate. Overall, I can see no democratically important distinctions between the 
two situations.
Of course, Dryzek might respond that this hypothetical is too “clean.” If we 
were to fill in real-world characteristics for the states, we would find free trade IGOs 
more democratically problematic. Is this the case? Let us say that A is an 
authoritarian regime, with an economy based on oil exports. B and C are third-world 
states that rely heavily on coffee and sugar exports, and struggle to maintain their 
young democratic governments. D and E are long established first-world 
democracies. D has a much more progressive tax structure than E’s, but also has a 
smaller economy. In fact, A, B, C, and D all have economies that are significantly 
smaller than E’s, and for each E is their biggest importer. D and E decide to create a 
free trade zone, to be enforced by an IGO. A, B, and C are invited to join, but all are 
skeptical they would benefit, and each declines to join. Disappointed, the leaders of E
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pressure them to reconsider. E has little leverage over A, as there are many other 
states willing buy its oil, and A again declines. B and C, on the other hand, are not in 
a good bargaining positions. E threatens to greatly increase trade restrictions, and C 
changes its mind. B again declines, despite the pressure. Now, as in the previous 
hypotheticals, C, D, and E are members of a free trade regime while A, and B are not.
Let us say that oil exporting A is not greatly affected by any of this. D and E 
benefit from the free trade zone, however. C is a mixed bag; its economy has 
improved overall, but certain sectors have been damaged from the increased 
competition. B clearly suffers. As expected, B’s economy took a large hit from 
decreased exports to E, and this damage was magnified when its investment dollars 
flowed into the more promising economies of C, D, and E. Furthermore, B’s 
economic troubles were directly responsible for a military coup, and B is no longer a 
democratic state.
What do we make of all this from a democratic perspective? Certainly there 
are ways in which democracy suffers; after all, before the free trade regime there were 
four democratic states, now there are three. But does this mean that the free trade 
regime is itself undemocratic? I do not think it does for two reasons. First, even 
though we are rightly concerned with the worst off (the citizens of B), the citizens of 
E have democratic rights which should not be ignored. Democratic self- 
determination ought to allow the citizens of E to determine on what basis they will 
participate in cooperative trade with B. Even though we might disagree with E’s 
behavior, it is not prima facia undemocratic to be disagreeable by “driving a hard
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bargain.” This does not mean that E can do everything in its power to further its 
preferable world order, however. It would be undemocratically coercive for E to 
point its nuclear weapons toward B and then demand that it join the free trade regime, 
for example. One might be tempted to reply that in our hypothetical, an “economic 
atomic bomb” was pointed at B (and C), and therefore B’s democratic right to self 
determination was violated by E. But this response belittles actual coercion. Just as 
there are important moral distinctions between a pharmaceutical company that 
charges a high price for life saving drugs and a thief who demands “your money or 
your life,”46 so too there are important distinctions between the US’s economic 
embargo on Cuban goods, and its backing of the “Bay ot Pigs, for example. As 
demonstrated by B and C choosing differently, E did not take away B’s ability to
make a meaningful choice.
Similarly, during the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) offered suffering states financial assistance to 
help stop speculators from attacking their currencies, but states had to agree to 
significant political and economic reforms as conditions of assistance. Some scholars 
contend that the IMF’s demands were unreasonably harsh, as well as unwise, and that 
recipient states had no choice but to accept them. But this mistakes a tough 
decision” with “no decision.” There was an opportunity for choice; Malaysia 
declined the IMF’s offer, and Malaysia’s economic downturn was less severe than
^Simmons 1993.
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that of all states which accepted IMF aid and reforms.47 One might respond that this 
illustrates Dryzek’s point; our world would we be better off without economically 
liberal IGOs, like the IMF. Whether this is true is much debated. Nevertheless, the 
question of importance for democratic theorists is who decides if a state should be 
allowed to participate in free trade IGOs. If I am correct that IGO participatory 
decisions are generally not coercive, then it would seem undemocratic to preclude 
states from forming and participating in such regimes, as to do so would go against 
the basic democratic right to government by and for the people.
Second, we ought not base our judgements of democratic legitimacy on 
outcomes. If we were to rely on an outcomes approach to democracy, in our example 
we might just as readily conclude that B had no democratic right to decline 
participation, as the outcome of that decision was the loss of its democratic 
government. Obviously, such a judgement against B would be unfair, one reason 
being that B could not have known what would result. Likewise, in the initial stages 
of the free trade regime’s development it would not have been unreasonable for D and 
E to believe that B and C would want to join, or that their economies and young 
democratic institutions would be better off for their doing so. Furthermore, an 
outcomes approach to democratic global governance would provide little guidance to 
our world, as we would have to wait to see how things turn out before passing 
democratic judgements (or we could simply preclude states from organizing free trade
47See Joseph Stiglitz. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: 
Norton, p. 93.
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IGOs based on the possibility of an undesired outcome, which would mistakenly place 
prima facia democratic value in the status quo).
It is clear that Dryzek does not like the idea of IGO promotion of liberal 
economics, but it is not clear that we should regard free market IGOs as inherently 
undemocratic. Why should the presence of tariffs and other types of trade restrictions 
be considered prima facia more democratic than their absence (especially when we 
consider that many trade restrictions are a result of special interest lobbying rather 
than a realization of a generalized public interest)?48 It may be that free trade IGOs do 
indeed create pressures for states to liberalize their economies, but these pressures do 
not appear to be coercive, or for that matter less democratic than say the protectionist 
pressures that prevailed in the 1920s and 1930s, before free market IGOs gained 
prominence. And if we hold that democratic self-determination ought to be respected, 
then these questions of participation really should be left for states to decide, 
regardless of whether one’s opinion is that free trade IGOs lead to a Panglossian “best 
of all possible worlds,” or that they do more harm than good. Finally, if liberal free 
trade pressures are not inherently undemocratic, as I have argued, then the fact that 
free market IGOs punish non-compliance (non-coercively) does not appear to hinder 
the project of global democratic governance.
SECURITY AND POWER
Beyond his concerns for the economic consequences of cosmopolitanism,
48Mancur Olson 1982; Robert Reich 1991.,
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Dryzek is also worried about cosmopolitanism’s effects on other areas of global 
society, specifically security issues: “There are dangers too in the introduction of 
cosmopolitan principles and practices into a world characterized by gross inequalities 
of power.. .  In this light, cosmopolis is autocratic, not democratic.”49 Dryzek believes 
that cosmopolitan principles “can serve to legitimate dubious military interventions, 
such as those led by the United States in Somalia and Iraq in the early 1990s, or that 
undertaken by France to prop up a genocidal regime in Rwanda.”50 Dryzek 
recommends that conflicting parties be allowed to work out their differences. But, on 
its face, this prescription does not seem any more humane or democratic than 
cosmopolitan intervention, perhaps less so. The same principles of cosmopolitan 
intervention that Dryzek laments also allowed NATO and UN troops to intervene in 
Kosovo, where Serb troops were engaged in genocide. In one of the cases Dryzek 
highlights, intervention in Iraq, it is not clear that leaving Iraq alone would have 
eventually resulted in the “peace reconciliation” he predicts,51 unless, of course, 
“peace reconciliation” were to mean the absolute defeat of the Kuwaitis. Also, the 
US did not act alone: many countries from around the world (including many Islamic 
countries) supported the UN coalition against Iraq.
In the case of Rwanda, unfortunately, France did prop up a genocidal regime. 
In doing so, it was not acting as an agent of the UN general assembly or its Security
49Dryzek 2000, p. 119.
50Ibid.
5’Ibid.
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Council, however. France received approval by the Security Council for “Operation 
Turquoise,” but this was meant as an humanitarian intervention after the genocide. 
Certainly “Operation Turquoise” fell short in a number of ways, but it is estimated to 
have saved up to 14,000 lives.52 Furthermore, a UN report on the atrocities of 
Rwanda concluded that had a few thousand more UN peacekeepers been mobilized 
once the severity of the situation became known, much of the genocide could have 
been prevented, and up to 800,000 lives saved.53 Therefore, perhaps IGO security 
forces should be endowed with more rather than less power. Overall, it is simply not 
clear how Dryzek understands autocracy and democracy when he declares that 
cosmopolitan security interventions are autocratic rather than democratic. Perhaps he 
is again worried that IGOs are subverting local will. But again, simply because the 
global triumphs over the local does not mean that democracy suffers.
DRYZEK’S DEFENSE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY
Rather than looking to IGOs or states, Dryzek suggests that global civil society 
could, and should provide global governance. More precisely, transnational discourse 
within civil society ought to provide the bulk of global governance. Communicative 
power can be brought to bear on various areas of governance by concentrating strands
52Nicholas Wheeler. 2000. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 234.
53Report o f the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, United Nations, Office of the Spokesman for 
the Secretary-General, New York, 15 December 1999, cited in Peter Singer 2002, pp. 
4-5.
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of discourse (“nodes”) into “discourse networks,” according to Dryzek.54 These 
discourse networks would be democratic because the exchange of ideas would 
support the deliberative virtues of “openness, respect, reciprocity, communicative 
competence, and equality in the ability to raise and question points.”55 Powerful 
transnational discourse networks could provide critical guidance on a variety of global 
issues such as sweatshops, distribution of land mines, the operation of oil refineries, 
and sustainable development. Dryzek believes these networks will open democratic 
space if they, and international organizations (not only IGOs, but NGOs as well), do 
not try to subvert or bully those with local knowledge and interests. Democratically 
implemented and maintained, Dryzek believes that a myriad of discourse networks 
would provide participatory opportunity, focus, direction, and governance to global 
society.
Is this vision of transnational democracy through discourse networks 
plausible? Dryzek provides a number of persuasive examples of transnational 
discourse changing attitudes and eventually policies.56 Much of this change may have 
occurred regardless of democratic intentions, however. In order for his theory of 
transnational governance to be persuasive, Dryzek needs to give us reasons to believe 
that discourse networks can be intentionally fostered to magnify the positive 
contributions of public sphere discourse. Dryzek tells us that “[discourse] networks
54Dryzek 2000, pp. 133-139.
55Ibid.,p. 134.
56Ibid., pp. 124-29.
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emerge when individuals or groups that are similarly situated in one important 
respect, but different in most other respects, decide that their common interest would 
benefit from joint action.”57 But who or what is responsible for facilitating these 
networks? How can we encourage “individuals or groups that are similarly situated” 
to start creating more discourse networks? Should governments attempt to legislate 
discourse networks into existence? Are intellectuals and/or activists responsible for 
their creation and empowerment? Or do discourse networks rise spontaneously, 
absent any collective intention? If they do not rise spontaneously, then who or what 
can we hold accountable if and when discourse networks do not rise to provide the 
needed governance, or go astray and becomes authoritarian rather than democratic?
Furthermore, why should we consider such governance to be democratic? 
Dryzek characterizes himself as a “discursive democrat,” and indeed his theory 
certainly gives a large role to the power of discourse.58 However, his use of 
“democracy” seems to be entirely synonymous with “discourse,” while most accounts 
of democracy ultimately stress the power of the many to govern.59 Dryzek distances 
his ideas from traditional understandings of democracy in other ways as well. First, 
he claims that territorial boundaries are arbitrary, and therefore traditional 
understandings of democracy are not compelling.60 But Dryzek is focused on
57Ibid.,p. 134.
58Ibid„ p. 3.
59Robert Dahl. 1998. On Democracy. New Haven, Yale University Press.
60Dryzek 2000, p. 132
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transnational democracy, thus there should not be a problem of arbitrary borders 
since the world in its entirety is considered. Second, he states that he is more 
interested in democratic governance, than in formal democratic government.61 But 
Dryzek has not shown that the governance of discourse networks would be more 
representative of the relevant demos than would formal government institutions. In 
fact, one could argue that his discourse networks would create a “discursive 
aristocracy” of those with the education, information, and the communication skills to 
participate influentially.
Consider the issue of pharmaceutical patents. Dryzek contends that the debate 
in global civil society is between those who support the search for new 
pharmaceutical medicines in foreign lands as “bioprospecting,” and those who see the 
pharmaceutical companies as exploitive and engaged in “biopiracy.”62 Yet Dryzek 
does not say that there should be a discourse network formed to explore all sides of 
the issue and find out what the relevant demos understands its interests to be. Rather, 
Dryzek suggests that a discourse network should emerge to target the pre-determined 
evil of “biopiracy.”63 He leaves no room for a public that wants to maintain the 
status-quo: “Particular responses might involve defensive legal action, more 
aggressive legal action to pursue the transfer of private property rights in particular 
patents to local owners, political protest, organizing a boycott of a corporation, civil
6'Ibid.
62Ibid. p. 125.
63Ibid. p. 133.
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disobedience, media publicity, or work on an alternative developmental model to 
counter the inroads of market capitalism.”64 But what if this is not what the demos 
understands to be in its best interest? Is it unfathomable that a fully informed demos 
would want to continue “bioprospecting” rather than outlaw it as “biopiracy,” despite 
the unsettling abuses that sometimes occur (and provide disquieting anecdotes)?
Dryzek cautions that even though democracy is an open-ended project, this 
“does not mean democracy can mean anything one likes.”65 But it is not clear that 
Dryzek heeds his own caution: democracy is not synonymous with discourse,66 nor is 
criticism of established power necessarily democratic.67 Clearly there is a lot of 
rhetorical power in the label “democracy,” but in the case of Dryzek’s theory of 
“transnational democracy,” it is not clear that the label is appropriate. That said, to 
dismiss Dryzek’s ideas entirely would be a mistake. The discourse networks that 
Dryzek proposes could buttress democratic global governance by providing new 
information and perspectives on problems and policies, and by keeping a critical eye 
on how formal governmental organizations are exercising their power.
CONCLUSION
“ Ibid., p. 134.
65Ibid„ p. 135.
66Habermas 1996.
67This would be more accurately described as Foucaultian rather than 
democratic.
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Dennis Thompson rightly complains that those who propose vigorous civil 
society as a solution to the problems of global governance do not address the proper 
role of formal government institutions in their theories. Dryzek is no exception.
While Dryzek denigrates formal governmental institutions, both domestic and 
international, his discourse networks need the freedom and space created by formal 
governmental institutions. Dryzek writes, “We would have governance across states 
in terms of the order provided by transnational discourses, and government within 
states in terms of what states did under the influence of these discourses.”68 Beyond 
this, Dryzek does not consider the role played by domestic and international 
governmental institutions. Surely it matters. Civil society and public sphere 
discourse in Cuba, China, and North Korea is significantly different from civil society 
discourse in Sweden, Canada, and Costa Rica. Similarly, global civil society and 
transnational discourse networks would be different in a world populated by powerful 
and democratic IGOs than in a world without them.
Dryzek writes that Thompson’s ideas on deliberative states would work with 
his own in a “complementary fashion.”69 But Dryzek does not consider fully how his 
transnational discourse networks could also work in a scheme of cosmopolitan 
governance, such as the one suggested by David Held. Dryzek cursorily dismisses 
Held’s ideas, claiming that “discursive sources [of power] are ignored by Held,” even
68Dryzek 2000, p. 132.
69Ibid., 132.
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though Held includes civil society as one of his seven sites of global power.70 Dryzek 
is quick to dismiss cosmopolitanism because he thinks it too utopian to guide our all 
too real world. While cosmopolitans give a primary role to IGOs, Dryzek thinks them 
irredeemably undemocratic. In this chapter, I have tried to show that the reasons 
Dryzek forwards for holding IGOs as undemocratic are not persuasive, and that the 
discourse networks he advocates in lieu of IGOs might themselves suffer from 
democratic deficits.
This is not to say that vibrant transnational discourse should not play an 
important role in a democratic world order, however. Dryzek has argued persuasively 
that com m unicative power can change positively attitudes and policies. But if 
discourse networks were the primary source of democratic global governance, there 
could arise severe legitimacy problems with their representational authority. 
Therefore, as political thinkers continue to ponder ways our world might achieve 
effective and more legitimate democratic governance, they should not dismiss IGOs 
in favor of the communicative power of discourse networks, as Dryzek suggests. 
Rather, political theorists and philosopher should begin to consider more complicated 
systems of governance that can harness the potential found within both formal and 
informal spheres of global society.
70Ibid„ 121; Held, 1995, p. 181.
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Chapter 4 
On David Held’s Cosmopolitanism
In Democracy and the Global Order David Held outlines his vision for a 
democratic world order.1 Held envisions layers of government, extending from the 
local to the global, which will embed democratic procedures and values, as well as 
provide democratic solutions to global problems such as environmental degradation, 
over-population, poverty, unaccountable multinational corporations, excessive 
international currency speculation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Both Thompson and Dryzek fault Held for relying too heavily on IGOs, 
which they believe would lead to a decrease in overall democratic governance. I 
contend in chapters two and three that their arguments against Held are unpersuasive. 
This does not mean that Held’s theory of cosmopolitan democracy ought to be 
accepted, however. In this chapter I will evaluate Held’s ideas.
Held begins building his theory by engaging in a thought experiment, a sort of 
synthesis of Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” and Habermas’s “ideal speech situation.” 
From the thought experiment, Held concludes that autonomy is needed for citizens’ 
deliberation and choices to have meaning, and therefore citizen autonomy is a 
prerequisite of a democratic government. When Held turns his sights from his 
hypothetical thought experiment to real world governance, he observes that most 
nation states fall well short of ensuring citizen autonomy. The problem is not wholly
'Held 1995.
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caused by negligent states, however. According to Held, even if states had the will to 
provide their citizens with an acceptable levels of autonomy, states are unable to do so 
because of constraining pressures created by our globalized world. The states of 
today have de jure sovereignty, but increasingly they lack de facto sovereignty. Thus, 
Held believes that powerful regional and universal cosmopolitan governments must 
be instituted if democratic deliberation and governance is to be realized.
In order to make an informed judgement of Held’s theory of cosmopolitan 
governance, I will carefully examine the three foundations of his theory. First, I will 
look at whether Held is correct to conclude that de facto sovereignty of nation states is 
eroding because of increased globalization. If he is mistaken that states will 
eventually “wither away,” then perhaps an inter-state approach to governance might 
better provide our world with much needed democratic governance. Second, I will 
look at the conclusions Held draws from his democratic thought experiment. Held 
believes that his thought experiment shows that democratically necessary rights 
cannot be protected in an international state system and therefore cosmopolitan 
institutions are needed. If Held’s interpretation of the democratic thought experiment 
is unpersuasive, then his case for cosmopolitanism becomes less compelling. And 
third, I will look at the specific suggestions Held makes for cosmopolitan 
government, such as a democratically reformed, and greatly empowered United 
Nations. I will argue that there are reasons to be skeptical that Held’s ideals could be 
realized, and even if they could, it would not necessarily be good for democratic 
deliberation and governance.
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THE DECLINE OF THE STATE?
In the previous chapters I did not highlight the distinction between 
cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan IGO governance since the distinction was not 
essential to Thompson’s or Dryzek’s critiques. In this chapter, it will be necessary to 
distinguish the two types of supranational governance, however. Cosmopolitans such 
as Held contend that the important units of consideration and power are individual 
persons rather than nation states. Held envisions ideal IGOs as having their 
representatives directly elected by citizenries, rather than inter-state organizations in 
which state governments select their representatives. Thus, Held’s cosmopolitan 
institutions would be quite different than the most powerful IGOs of today.2
Held believes that the state centric system of global power distribution is in 
decline, dismissing the “globalization sceptics” who hold that nation state sovereignty 
has not been significantly affected by the changes of the 20th century.3 But Held also 
distances himself from the “hyper-globalists,” who hold that today’s world is already 
fully integrated and globalized. Held finds a middle ground, although it lies much 
closer to that of the hyper-globalists. Held believes that although globalization is not 
complete, it has fundamentally altered Westphalian nation state sovereignty, and we 
are now living in a world in which states are unable to handle our most pressing
2The EU parliament being the obvious exception. But even this is exception is 
only partial, as the representatives in the other branches of the EU are selected by 
state governments.
3For the view of the sceptic, see Krasner 1999.
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problems. He concludes that new forms of government beyond, and more powerful 
than nation states are needed.
Are nation state authority and sovereignty eroding to the extent that Held 
claims? Held discusses a number of “disjuncts” between notions of sovereign states 
and the way governance within and between states actually works. Although he does 
not claim that each disjunct gives sufficient reason to disregard state sovereignty, he 
does believe that the totality of the disjuncts gives sufficient reason to doubt theories 
of governance anchored upon state power. In the following subsections I will 
examine each of the disjuncts that Held discusses. If the disjuncts are not as troubling 
as Held claims, then his case for cosmopolitan, rather than inter-state, governance is 
weakened.
International Law
Held claims that international law is increasingly cosmopolitan, in that respect 
for states’ Westphalian sovereignty is often ignored in favor of cosmopolitan 
concerns.4 Specifically, concern for human rights can trump states’ rights to 
determine how to treat their citizens. “From the minorities treaties, associated with 
the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War, to the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and subsequent Covenants on Rights 
(1966), it has been recognized that individuals have rights and obligations over and 
above those set down in their own judicial and authority systems.”5 Moreover,
4Held 1995, pp. 101-07.
5Ibid. p., 101.
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international law’s respect for human rights is not limited to issues of trivial 
significance. Rather, international law has set a precedent of enforcing human rights 
in the most sensitive areas of state power: “The legal framework of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal marked a highly significant change in the legal direction of the modem state, 
for the new rules challenged the principle of military discipline and subverted national 
sovereignty at one of its most sensitive points: the hierarchical relations withing the 
military.”6 This leads Held to conclude that “Respect for the autonomy of the subject, 
and for an extensive range of human rights, creates a new set o f ordering principles in 
political affairs which, where effectively entrenched, can delimit and curtail the 
principle o f state sovereignty itself’ (italics mine).7
Certainly Held is correct to assert that the protection of individual rights by 
international accord is new and significant; globalization skeptics are mistaken in 
asserting that there is nothing new under the sun. But simply because the hard-line 
skeptical position is dubious, this does not mean that state sovereignty is limited in a 
way that makes cosmopolitan governance necessary. It may be that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is significant and that it has the potential to limit certain 
aspects of state sovereignty. But it ought to be kept in mind that the Declaration was 
created in a deliberative forum of state representatives and was crafted in such a way 
that all participating states were able to agree to its content. Therefore, it is seems 
problematic to conclude that state sovereignty is encroached by the Declaration, when
6Ibid.,p. 102.
7Ibid., p. 103.
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all states agreed to bind themselves by it. As Plato long ago pointed out, reasoned 
self-binding may be an expression of true sovereignty, while the freedom to fulfil 
unreasonable wishes may be slavery.8 States collectively agreeing not to engage in 
genocide, slavery, and torture does not need to portend the demise of states’ 
significance; rather, it may speak of their adaptability to an evolving global 
consciousness.
Held also uses the Nuremberg trials as an example of the erosion of state 
sovereignty because he believes that it affects one of the most sensitive areas of state 
sovereignty, military power. But this too is not entirely convincing evidence for his 
conclusion. The Nuremberg trials -  along with the Tokyo trials, and more recently 
the trial of Slobodan Milosevic -  concerned officers (and a president) from countries 
that suffered military defeat. Punishment of the defeated is common throughout 
history, as respect for sovereignty is not often extended to the vanquished.9 Held’s 
position would be much stronger if his examples showed international courts 
punishing military officers of a still powerful regime, against that regime’s wishes.10
8Plato. 1992. Republic. Transl. G.M.A. Grube, revised by C.D.C. Reeve. 
Cambridge: Hacket Publishing Company.
9In some cultures military defeat has meant cannibalization. Tobias 
Schneebaum documents the cannibalism that took place after a tribal conflict in the 
Amazon; Tobias Schneebaum. 1969. Keep the River on Your Right. New York: 
Grove Press.
,0Held also brings up a successful civil suit in US domestic courts against the 
estate of Ferdinand Marcos. The lawsuit sought damages for the killings of labor 
leaders in Seattle that were carried out by a Filipino intelligence unit. The court case 
took place long after Ferdinand had fell from power, however. Moreover, not only 
was Marcos deceased at the time of the ruling, but he was by no means a martyr,
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The right to be governed by democratic institutions is a notion that is 
increasingly accepted in institutions which create and enforce international law and, 
according to Held, this exemplifies decreased state sovereignty. The Council of 
Europe’s requirement that states be democratic before joining the European Union 
demonstrates such a decrease in state sovereignty." Requiring that states be 
democratic to gain membership in the EU is a far cry from saying that states no longer 
have a right to be undemocratic, however. And, it does not mean that states are less 
sovereign simply because states move toward more deeply democratic domestic 
institutions in order to gain membership in international organizations like the EU. 
Certainly membership has its privileges, but rewards for action (as opposed to 
crippling punishments) are seldom coercive.12
In response to Held, Will Kymlicka argues that the decision of Baltic states to 
join the Council of Europe was not an example of newly constrained sovereignty. On 
the contrary, it was a demonstration of the increased sovereignty of the Baltic states, 
as those states never had the option to join such international institutions during the 
Cold War, because of the coercive force exerted by the Soviet Union.13 I would go a
having been run out of his homeland as a crook. The conclusions Held reaches from 
this case about the decline of state sovereignty reach much too far.
"Held 1995, pp. 104-05.
12Simmons 1993; Hart 1965.
13 Will Kymlicka. 1999. Citizenship in an era of globalization: commentary 
on Held. In Democracy’s Edges. Eds. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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step further than Kymlicka and assert that the presence of IGOs that allow states to 
self-bind not only demonstrates freedom from coercive states like the former Soviet 
Union, but also demonstrates an increased freedom (and sovereignty) from Hobbesian 
international anarchy. Certainly states have always had the choice whether to respect 
human and democratic rights, but this is an easier choice to make when institutions 
are in place to mitigate (through punishments, oversight, and publicity) the 
competitive advantages of states that do not respect those rights.
This is not to say that international law, and our understanding of nation state 
sovereignty, has not evolved since the time of Grotius and the conference of 
Westaphalia. Certainly they have. But it is not clear why such an evolution lends 
weight to the proposition that nation states will, in the not-too-distant future, “wither 
away.”14 Kant, whose ideas Held relies heavily upon, long ago foresaw the potential 
for international law to regulate affairs between republican states, yet Kant never 
thought that an increasingly significant international law necessitates the decreasing 
importance of states, or a diminishment of their sovereignty.15 Kant thought that 
states governed by the rule of law and accountable to their people would be more 
interested in commerce and peace than in conquest and war, and would therefore 
choose to institute and obey international law. Held is correct to point out that 
international law has changed since 1648, but he has not argued persuasively that the
14Held 1995, p. 233.
15Immanuel Kant. 1983. Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Transl. Ted 
Humphrey. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
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changes demonstrate the decreasing political significance of nation states.
The Internationalization o f Political Decision-Making
Held believes that the “internationalization of political decision-making,” as 
evidenced by the proliferation of transnational non-state actors, is problematic for 
state centric theories of global democratic governance. “In 1909 there were 37 IGOs 
and 176 INGOs, while in 1989 there were nearly 300 IGOs and 4624 INGO’s. In the 
middle of the nineteenth century there were two or three conferences or congresses 
per annum sponsored by IGOs; today the number totals close to 4000 annually.”16 
Held believes that the number of these institutions and congresses is troubling for 
state-centric theories, but his arguments supporting this conclusion are thin. In fact, 
their mere existence seems to be evidence enough, of the decreasing significance of 
states. Although Held seems to realize that this is not his strongest point, and spends 
little effort arguing it, it is important to point out that one could reasonably interpret 
the proliferation of IGOs and INGOs as evidence of the continued relevance of nation 
states. Post WWII existence was characterized by the Cold War. The fact that the 
war remained “cold” meant there was enough peace, stability, and predictability for 
states to form inter-state organizations in an attempt to mitigate, or even solve 
international collective action problems.
Of the many IGOs that were created in the 20th century, two of the most 
damaging to state sovereignty, according to Held, are the IMF and the World Bank. 
Both organizations have made wide use of conditionality. In the case of the IMF,
16Held 1995, p. 108.
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this means countries are required to “cut public expenditure, limit public-sector wages
and employment, devalue its currency and reduce subsidized welfare programmes”
before obtaining desperately needed loans.17 In the case of the World Bank,
conditionality often means “exacting standards of monetary and fiscal rectitude,
increased leeway for the private sector, the steady removal of domestic protections
from the forces of the international economy and... the requirements o f ‘good
governance’, comprising respect for human rights, liberal democratic mechanisms of
public accountability and effective public administration.”18
Held believes that such conditionality is a sign of the decreasing significance
of state sovereignty:
A striking tension has emerged between the idea of the state -  centered on 
national politics and national institutions -  and the nature of decision-making 
at the international level. While de jure sovereignty may not be directly 
infringed, the decision-making process of the IMF raises serious questions 
about the conditions under which a political community is able to determine 
its own policies and directions... In current circumstances, there is little a 
developing country can do to resist this.19
But one ought to be careful not to overestimate the devolution of sovereignty from
states to the IMF and World Bank, as the states that are subjected to conditionality
agree to it. Of course one could argue in a similar vein as Wallerstein (as Held seems
to), that the global economic system forces states into the periphery of economic
affairs, where they are dependent and vulnerable, and therefore there is little
17Ibid., pp. 109-10.
18Ibid„ p. 110.
19Ibid.
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meaningful choice in their request of loans.20 But even if one were to accept this 
view, one must ask whether state sovereignty would be more entrenched if 
organizations like the IMF and World Bank did not exist. This is an important 
question because Held is arguing that these IGOs are displacing political power from 
states. But if we imagine a world without the IMF and the World Bank, it does not 
seem obvious that state sovereignty would be more entrenched. In some respects, 
economically troubled states would suffer more, and thereby have less de facto 
sovereignty, since they would not have access to the relatively low interest loans and 
would be left with the often less appealing options of requesting higher interest loans 
from private creditors, seeking aid from other states, or simply suffering economic 
collapse -  all of which remain options in a world containing the IMF and World 
Bank. Thus, economic IGOs might actually increase state sovereignty, in the sense 
that they provide states with another option — even if that option can itself constrain.
Of course many scholars believe that IMF and World bank conditionality 
requirements have been so damaging to recipient states that those states would have 
been better off had no such institutions existed.21 Indeed, Held sprinkles his argument 
with insinuations that the neo-liberal economics of such institutions are unwise and 
contextually ill-informed:
20Immanuel Wallerstein. 1974. The Rise and Future Demise of the World 
Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History. 15: 387-415; see also Christopher Chase-Dunn. 1989. Global 
Formation: Structures o f the World Economy. Cambridge: Blackwell.
21For a thoughtful critique of the IMF, see Stiglitz 2002.
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Tough conditionality lending has often been tantamount to ‘shock treatment’ 
for a country, fundamentally unsettling its institutions and customs... The 
IMF has tended in recent times to take ‘structural adjustment’ to the 
international economy as a fixed point of orientation, downplaying both the 
external origins of a country’s difficulties and the structural pressures and 
rigidities of the world economy itself.22
But does this mean that if the IMF and World Bank had created wise and beneficial
structural adjustment packages, then Held would be forced to hold that the
sovereignty of states is increasing? Obviously not, thus it seems that Held is
confusing his argument on this point by bringing in tangential and emotive evidence.
But even if it actually is the case that IMF and World Bank loan recipient
states are having their sovereignty curtailed in ways that are damaging, we would still
need to assess whether Held is correct to use this as evidence that overall state
sovereignty has eroded to the point that global governance ought to be cosmopolitan
rather than inter-state. Indeed, this conclusion does not seem to follow, especially as
Held believes that the real powers controlling the IMF and World Bank are the
powerful states of the North.23 Thus, Held’s example only serves to demonstrate that
weak states lack de facto sovereignty, which is a point that even globalization skeptics
would readily accept.24 Therefore, if we are seeking a plan for increased global
democratic governance, this speaks to the need to design effective IGOs which work
in conjunction with the power of nation states, rather than as replacement powers.
22Held 1995, p. 110.
23Ibid., p. 111.
24See Krasner 1999.
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Lastly, Held argues that the European Union is another example of the 
internationalization of decision-making that should lead us to question the de facto 
sovereignty of states. This is Held’s strongest argument on this issue. Something 
new is happening here. The most powerful states of Europe are agreeing to devolve 
important aspects of their decision-making authority to the EU. Nevertheless, there 
are two points to keep in mind before concluding that state sovereignty is waning 
significantly. First, as with countries that decide to accept IMF and World Bank 
loans, states have a non-coerced choice whether to join the EU. Second, and perhaps 
most importantly, the EU is primarily an inter-state, rather than a cosmopolitan, 
organization. There are indeed cosmopolitan elements to the EU, such as the 
European Parliament, but most of the EU’s power is wielded by state selected 
representatives. Thus, it seems problematic to use the EU as an example of the 
preferability of cosmopolitan governance, at least in the way Held has used it.25 
Hegemonic Powers and International Security Structures
After WWII, the world’s power configuration became bi-polar, defined by the 
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Held believes that during 
this time many states were forced to devolve sovereignty over their security to the US 
led NATO organization, or to the Soviet led Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO). 
Moreover, after the Cold War ended, sovereignty was not returned to member states, 
as new threats came to the fore, such as threats from the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction:
25See Kymlicka 1999.
91
In an age in which modem weapons systems can inflict devastating 
consequences on the environment -  through, for example, radioactive fall-out, 
climate change, or the massive destruction of populations -  the actions of each 
and every state are deeply interlocked with the future and destiny of every 
other political entity.26
Thus, Held contends, the logic of statist model of security no longer works in a post
Cold War world.
But Held’s logical support for this point is a bit nebulous. He begins by 
explaining how the Cold War limited the sovereignty of most states, and then argues 
that since the end of the Cold War states have not seen a return of their autonomy 
because of contemporary security threats. But to support this point, Held refers to the 
undesirability of statist security, rather than to evidence that statist security has 
waned:
First, it [a statist security logic] denies democracy internationally by 
reinforcing the sense of the separateness of sovereign states and their ultimate 
responsibility for their own defense and security. Accordingly, states accept, 
at best, minimum responsibility for people in other countries. Second, it 
erodes democracy within nation-states by legitimizing institutions which are 
hierarchical, which thrive on secrecy and which, in an age of weapons of mass 
destruction, give a tiny group of people power over the future of life itself.27
Even though Held’s argument is loose on this point, his conclusion may yet be 
sound: the traditional international relations understanding of every state for itself is 
impractical, if not devastating, in a world full of biological, chemical, and nuclear 
weapons. But, that said, why would this necessitate a cosmopolitan rather than an
26Held 1995, p. 118.
27Ibid., p. 119
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inter-state solution? It is true that during the Cold War sovereignty on security issues 
was ceded by some states, but Held makes too much of this. During the Cold War 
states still had meaningful choices to make. States could side with the United States, 
with the Soviet Union, remain neutral, or try to play the two sides against each other 
for their own benefit. Moreover, during the Cold War the US and the Soviet Union 
certainly thought that states, even small and undeveloped states like Vietnam, were 
critically important units of political power, rather than shells of their past relevance. 
And, the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons occurred long 
before the Cold War’s end. The environmental and security consequences of the Cold 
War going “hot” would also have been universal in nature. Now that the Cold War is 
over, why would the presence of WMDs lend weight to the position that states are 
losing relevance?
It may be that Held has confused “balance of power” politics and ideology, 
with the international state system itself. Surely there is theoretical ground available 
to assert that balance of power politics no longer makes sense in the post Cold War 
world, without also having to conclude that nation states are less relevant to global 
security. And if this is the case, then it seems that the nature of contemporary security 
issues may just as well lend weight to an inter-state approach to global governance as 
to a cosmopolitan one.
National Identity and the Globalization o f Culture
Another disjunctive between our ideas of state sovereignty and the reality of
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state sovereignty, is the “globalization of culture.”28 Held thinks that states’ ability to 
control the identity, language, values, images, and information of their citizens has 
eroded in the second half of the twentieth century. With jet passenger airplanes, 
international tourism, cable television, satellites, personal computers, the internet, and 
global access to films, culture goes beyond state borders and is increasingly global. 
“These developments have been interpreted as creating a sense of global belonging 
and vulnerability which transcends loyalties to the nation-state; that is, to ‘my country 
right or wrong.’”29 Moreover, “The cultural space of nation-states is being 
rearticulated by forces over which states have, at best, only limited leverage.”30
But does this portend the end of the nation state and the need for cosmopolitan 
governance? If one considers the meaning of “sovereignty,” certainly a decreasing 
ability to control the information and images by states is evidence of decreasing 
sovereignty. But is such a decrease relevant? Or, in other words, when one says, 
“state sovereignty is decreasing,” is this the aspect of sovereignty that should come to 
mind? Let us say that I am the CEO of a software company and in the past I enforced 
a traditional dress code. Because of the current cultural trends in the tech industry, 
however, I have found in recent years that it is near impossible to keep talented
28Held 1995, pp. 121- 127; 1999. The Transformation of Political 
Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization. In Democracy’s 
Edges. Eds. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 98-99.
29Held, 1995, p. 124.
30Ibid., p. 126.
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employees while maintaining the strict dress code. Therefore, I relax the dress code 
in order to keep and attract talented employees. In one sense I have lost some 
sovereignty over my company. But does this mean that I am less relevant as a CEO? 
Or, that software company CEOs are in general less relevant to their companies’ 
success, because we all feel the pressure to do away with formal dress requirements? 
Consider that it may be the case that relaxing the dress code actually enhances 
employee productivity. Perhaps they are more comfortable and therefore better able 
to concentrate on their tasks, and are more willing to spend longer hours at work, for 
example. Thus, even though one aspect of my sovereignty over my company was 
compromised, it does not mean that my ability to extract productivity from my 
employees, which is one of the core purposes of a CEO, has also been compromised. 
In fact, it may be the case that the loss of sovereignty in a relatively unimportant 
arena, has actually enhanced my sovereignty in an arena that is critical to fulfilling my 
role as a CEO.
Held states that “To what extent and how people are able to determine their 
own identity, culture and values in the face of the international and transnational 
media networks are crucial issues at the end of the twentieth century” (italics mine).31 
But similar to the hypothetical of my choice not to uphold a traditional dress code, it 
is not at all clear why control over cultural elements ought to be considered “crucial” 
to states. Exchange of information, ideas, food, religions, art, customs, and many 
other aspects of culture have always taken place among peoples and states:
31Held 1995, p. 127.
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Humans are curious and adventurous animals: they travel, they migrate, they 
trade, they fight, and they plunder. And they report back what they have found 
out about the ways in which others live (and trade and fight etc.). They bring 
back tales of exotic customs as well as the exotic goods they have purchased 
or stolen. One result of this is that custom, practice, language, and social and 
military organization seldom stay local. The pure culture, uncontaminated in 
its singularity, is for this reason an anomaly; it is an exception usually 
explained by historical contingency and extraordinary geographical isolation. 
For human cultures, it is the rule, not the exception, that ideas and ways of 
doing things are propagated and transmitted, noticed and adapted.32
Thus, if cultural exchange is not new, why is the rapidity with which it takes place
(which may be new), of “crucial” significance to state sovereignty? And how does
this speak to a need for cosmopolitan governance?
The answers to these questions depend on how one understands culture. If
one holds that the important part of one’s own culture is its distinctiveness, and that in
order to have self-esteem one must be aware of and embrace her cultural
distinctiveness, then an institution capable of controlling exchanges of information
and images may indeed be important to a persuasive theory of global democratic
governance. But it seems that what is important about a culture is not its
distinctiveness, but that it transmits understanding and purpose. Jeremy Waldron
argues persuasively on this point:
We should not assume that thoughts about one’s culture -  whether they are 
thoughts about its distinctiveness or anything else -  loom very large in one’s 
own involvement in the cultural life of one’s community. What one does in a 
community is simply speak or marry or dance or worship. One participates in 
a form of life. Advertising or announcing that this is what one is doing is 
participation in another form of life -  a different form of life -  a form of life 
only problematically related to the first... It seems very odd to regard the fact
32Jeremy Waldron. 2000. What is Cosmopolitan. The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. 8 (2): 237 - 243.
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that something is ‘our’ norm -  that is, that this is what we Irishmen or we 
Maori or we Americans do -  as part of the reason, if not the central reason, for 
having the norm, and for sustaining and following it. .. Social norms and 
practices do not exist in order to make up a colorful distinctive culture for us 
to display and immerse ourselves in.33
If the value of culture is not found in its distinctiveness, but rather its ability to embed
our lives with meaningful images and answers to important questions, then it does not
seem necessary for government to be able to preserve cultural distinctiveness: as
cultures will assimilate, dissimilate, and in other ways evolve on their own.
Moreover, if a significant part of what makes culture valuable is that it provides
reasons and understandings of how to live, then it would seem that exposing people to
outside ideas would often strengthen the reasons on which people base their actions.
For example, if a father is planning on mutilating the genitals of his daughter for
reasons given to him by his local culture, but is then exposed to outside images and
ideas that lead him to question those reasons, is this necessarily bad, simply because
the images and ideas came from beyond his domestic state’s borders? It would not
seem to be. The idea that reasons and beliefs should be exposed to opposing views
has a long philosophical history. Socrates famously argued that reason and belief
ought not be protected from probing. And more recently, John Stuart Mill argued
compellingly that humans benefit from exposure to different ideas, even if those ideas
are not completely true.34
It is simply not clear why states’ ability to control their culture is significant to
33Ibid. pp. 234-5.
34John Stuart Mill 1985.
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their continued political relevance. The former Soviet Union controlled its citizens’ 
access to outside cultural influences much more vigorously than did the United States. 
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the US was weaker, or less relevant as a 
state than the Soviet Union because more trans-territorial images and influences 
reached its citizenry. By extension, it is not clear why a world populated by states 
which choose to allow -  or find it impossible to prohibit -  external cultural 
influences ought to be considered evidence of the decreasing governing potential of 
states. This is not to say that the globalization of culture is irrelevant to all aspects 
global governance, however. Giving people access to images of famine in Africa, the 
protests of Tiananmen Square, the mass graves of Kosova, the slaughter in Rwanda, 
and the terrorism of 9/11, should go a long ways in creating greater understanding of 
the need for global affairs to be ordered.
Globalization and Economy
Held writes that pressures from MNCs, international currency speculators, 
and transnational banks have reduced nation-states’ sovereignty over their economic 
choices. Economic arenas which states have traditionally regulated are now difficult, 
if not impossible to control without suffering major repercussions such as capital 
flight. “As a result, the autonomy of democratically elected governments has been, 
and is increasingly, constrained by sources of unelected and unrepresentative 
economic power.”35 For Held this serves as further evidence of the need for 
cosmopolitan governance. But before one agrees with Held s interpretation, it is
35Held 1999, p. 98.
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important to ask whether democratic governance ought to require that all aspects of 
economies be controlled by political institutions.
It is not obvious that in the past state governments have ever had a high degree 
of control over their economies. If they did, then states would not have allowed their 
economies to fall into the great depression of the early nineteen thirties, for example. 
Or, the Soviet Union would not have allowed its state run economy to lead to the 
demise of its empire. Of course this is not exactly what is troubling Held. Even 
though he asserts that states have less control over their economies, what actually 
seems to bother Held is the growing consensus among policy makers that the neo­
liberal paradigm provides the best model for how states ought to run their economies.
“The Washington Consensus” refers to the belief that states should cut deficit 
spending and get control of inflation, before addressing other priorities such as full 
employment, providing robust social programs, or even feeding their poor.36 But 
whether such neo-liberal policies have gained sway in the most powerful states, 
whether powerful states put pressure on weaker states to adhere to neo-liberal 
policies, and even whether people suffer because of the implementation of neoliberal 
policies, are different questions than whether states truly had more control over their 
economies in the past. It is debated whether our world is destined to continue cycles 
of hegemonic leadership in the future, but it is more-or-less uncontroversial that over 
the past five centuries powerful states have tried to impose their will -  including their
36Stiglitz 2002.
99
economic will — on the less powerful states.37 Held has not shown that states have 
less control over recession, depression, inflation, and unemployment. Rather, he has 
only demonstrated that the economic policies of states have tended to be in line with 
neoliberal prescriptions, which does not show that economic globalization is leading 
to the irrelevance of nation-states.
Globalization and the Environment
Held believes that the globalization of environmental problems provides 
further evidence that the state system cannot anchor democratic politics. Held points 
to three distinct types of environmental problems that speak to the state system’s 
inadequacy. First, there are shared problems involving the global commons (e.g. 
global warming). Second, there are “interlinked challenges of demographic 
expansion and resource consumption” (e.g. desertification). And finally, there are 
problems of trans-boundary pollution (e.g. acid rain). Given that environmental 
problems are oblivious to territorial borders, yet need to be addressed, “The proper 
‘home’ of politics and democracy becomes a puzzling matter.”38
But however puzzling, Held does not believe that answers can be found in 
domestic states, or even in inter-state solutions. Again, as with the other areas of 
globalization, I believe Held makes too much out of the tension he observes. Simply
37See Keohane 1984; Joseph Nye Jr., 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing 
Nature o f American Power. New York: Basic Books; George Modelski. 1987. Long 
Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Paul Kennedy. 
1987. The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.
38Held 1999, p. 100.
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because environmental problems cross borders, does not mean that states are not best 
situated to handle those problems. One aspect that Held does not seem to consider is 
that part of the problem may lie with the citizens, rather than with the current 
structures of governance. If the US demos cared more deeply about greener 
legislation, then perhaps the fate of the Kyoto protocol could have been avoided, for 
example. And if they do not care, then giving citizens suffrage in cosmopolitan 
institutions would not change things. Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol -  which many 
experts thought would have been a solid stepping stone from which to approach our 
world’s transboundary environmental problems -  was an inter-state, rather than 
cosmopolitan, measure. Certainly there are many grass roots organizations and 
movements seeking to address environmental problems, but the failure of Kyoto was 
widely lamented because it would have bound states.
It seems that with regards to the “disjuncture” between globalization and the 
environment, and indeed all of the disjunctures that Held discusses, he is correct to 
point out that states and our ideas of state sovereignty are changing. Yet Held has not 
persuasively shown how these changes ought to lead us to conclude that democratic 
global governance needs to be cosmopolitan, rather than inter-state. And until such 
arguments are persuasively made, it would seem prima facia more reasonable to try to 
bend the current political configuration in such a way that global democratic 
governance could be better realized, than it would be to hope that states become weak 
enough to be replaced by new cosmopolitan organizations. That said, we have yet to 
examine core elements of Held’s democratic thought experiment; thus, it would be
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premature to dismiss his conclusions at this point.
HELD’S DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
In order to determine the requirements of an acceptable democratic world 
order, Held engages in a democratic thought experiment. The thought experiment is 
similar to Rawls’s hypothetical social contract in that it takes place behind a “veil of 
ignorance,” and is similar to Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” in that participants 
seek consensus, and the only allowable force is that of the better argument. 
Furthermore, Held’s thought experiment is democratic in that it is assumed that 
participants find primary political value in citizens’ ability to deliberate and vote on 
political decisions. Thus, those who value autocracy or theocracy over democracy 
would not take part in the hypothetical conversation.39
Held concludes that the participants in his thought experiment would arrive at 
a consensus on the need for citizen autonomy, because if true democratic government 
is to be achieved, citizens must have enough autonomy to meaningfully deliberate and 
vote. And since participants in the thought experiment would be ignorant of their 
particular life positions, they would want to ensure autonomy for everyone, including 
the poor.40 Thus, the participants would reject any political configuration that would 
lead to classes of “nautonomic” citizens. “Nautonomy,” defined by Held, “refers to 
the asymmetrical production and distribution o f life-chances which limit and erode
39Held 1995. pp. 160-67.
""Ibid.
102
— mam9. »kw W w o  that ihc i n i p n i  m km ten * *  apm m >  m 4 J  h w
to proacrt ou/cn aumnoar) «  «oc» cnacaJ m m  of pomm fend*. « « to r .d M r . 
croc iwKMHom. economy, c w n n t n c ta m  m J i«|Wtm d tiiliw i. a*4 tofto *al 
MpriHvj) uutituuom. Held coaciudr* that the mM«)i of w*r» to potato eitucn
M mnim) m thnc mcm m ow  lhal » • A w tl punts (ommpjMm |b W  
Ki^tmifKc In thii Kcttun. I will httcfK c tjm ifv  lirkJ t Jsm-uwu# of cacti ot the 
m tn  d m  of prnw  I « |u r  lhal m all w x a  of ihc M n of poo w, U N i «M U) 
could provide Ihc le n t of autoiMny llcU ik w n . 01 IWd’i  n u ip iM M  of ihe 
content of Ihc comcmw regarding dm mvm to w walwl»calfy dmaaahag -d tm fow 
hit concluMon lhal (u m o p iiiln  y t w w iw i to pnim M r to u*rt ■«•*» p « h m k i it
Tht Both umi W tifon
Widi iceento to dw hod> wd ito ceem|»iedtoe rtgl* to hwl*. IIHd witoe
dM “people find ihc*m*l*c» m 1—inwntmr <k«m m k<« if *r» <h> *« hav* mx*m
to the health « m * aa  which allow dww •»**■> * t» a to *  *•«*■*** • * •
ttiMwtm h yk —d f a » »  «h» i«>w y t hrtto»w wtfch to n p iM  af * m  *  ««*■ 
of lhn» metnherdwr  of w w h  "* h
lanc <haIdrtn Thto M l cmh  miaan — i  10 < iito w » a in  M l ( h i M  M a n ,
”* ad .p  171. 
‘•‘Meld IW . p ITT
101
but also abortions on demand. Held’s contention that people need to be relatively 
healthy to fully participate in democratic governance does not seem overly 
controversial. And, Held recognizes that although many states do not provide as 
much autonomy in this area as his thought experiment would suggest, some states do. 
Thus, autonomy over our bodies does not serve as a major point in Held’s argument 
for powerful cosmopolitan institutions, since states actually could, if they had the will 
and the resources, provide autonomy in this area.
Held’s second site of power is “welfare,” which refers to the cultivation of 
abilities and talents that citizens require to participate fully in economic and political 
life.43 To secure welfare autonomy, Held suggests that citizens have rights to 
universal childcare, universal education, and a number of other community services.44 
I do not want to spend time discussing this site of power because, similar to his 
discussion of the body, Held does not make a strong argument that states are unable to 
promote the necessary welfare rights, as both health and welfare rights have been 
increasingly protected in recent decades.
Cultural Life
Held’s third power site is cultural life, which “refers to those realms of social 
activity where matters of public interest and identity can be discussed, where 
differences of opinion can be explored and where local custom and dogma can be
43Held 1995, p. 178.
44Ibid., p. 192.
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examined.”45 Unfortunately, Held is not always clear as to what needs to be in place
to avoid cultural nautonomy:
Patterns of meaning also include aesthetic or ritual practices, which can be 
organized in a variety of ways through secular or ‘sacred’ forms of authority. 
Through these authorities, frames o f meaning are produced and reproduced 
which can inform the development of political and social identity. 
Asymmetrical access to the production and distribution of interpretative 
schemes and practices, as well as to rhetorical abilities and skills, are a mark 
of nautonomy in the sphere of culture. Where collective power operates to 
control or manipulate a claim to meaning, or to set tight limits on how people 
might act morally in relation to each other and to nature, nautonomic forces 
may be present.46
Held seems to be saying that it is democratically problematic when one culture 
becomes more respected and influential than another. But what exactly does he want 
democratic political institutions to do about it?
Held suggests several rights that would serve to protect cultural variation, such 
as rights to freedom of thought, faith, expression, criticism, and a right to be tolerated. 
There might be a tension within this list of rights, however. With rights to freedom of 
thought, faith, expression, and criticism, it would seem that Held is advocating a 
laissez-fair approach to culture. Yet, Held contends that democratic government 
needs to protect citizens against “circumstances whereby some groups are denied 
access to dominant cultural codes or are expected to be mere ‘receivers’ of them...
In the latter case, such organs may be in the hands of distinctive social groupings, 
religious hierarchies or the economically privileged, who may control or prevent
45Ibid., p. 180.
46Ibid.
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access to them.”47 Although this may be compatible with a right to toleration, it is not 
clear that it would be compatible with rights to freedom of thought, faith, expression 
and criticism. After all, if I have the freedom to think for myself, and to express those 
thoughts, then I ought to be free to express my disapproval of others. Held wants 
“freedom of criticism,” but it seems he only wants it so long as the criticism is aimed 
at those who are more culturally powerful. But certainly enforcing a right in this way 
would be problematic and contentious.
Even if consensus could be reached on Held’s list of rights, which seems quite 
plausible, it is unlikely that all participants would agree to his interpretation of what a 
right to toleration entails. To tolerate means, more-or-less, to live and let live. But in 
doing so, I, or my group, is allowed to believe and say what we want about others. 
Many powerful cultural organizations -  the Catholic Church, for example -  are 
hierarchical, exclusive, and are sometimes critical of less powerful groups, and 
therefore would run afoul of Held’s understanding of a right to be tolerated. To ban 
such cultural structures from society would be problematic, if not undesirable. Surely 
at least some of the participants in Held’s thought experiment would recognize this, 
and not be part of a consensus which would outlaw them.
Civic Associations
The fourth site of power is that of civic associations. Held conceives civic
47Ibid.
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associations as an important subset of civil society.48 “The realm of civic 
associations, thus, refers to the array of institutions and organizations in and through 
which individuals or groups can pursue their own projects independently of the direct 
organization of the state or of economic collectivities such as corporations or trade 
unions.”49 Held believes that democratic citizens need to be free to form and 
participate in voluntary associations from “charities and churches to political 
organizations and social movements.”50 But beyond buttressing democratic 
governmental institutions, Held believes the civic associations themselves need to be 
democratic:
The latter [nautonomic situation] results when organizations and institutions take on a 
‘life of their own’ which may lead them to depart from the wishes and interests of 
their members. Such may be the case when they generate oligarchic tendencies -  
organizational structures which ossify and leaders who become unresponsive elites to 
those in lower echelons.”51
That participants in Held’s democratic thought experiment would agree that civic 
associations are important to democracy, seems uncontroversial. But his 
understanding of what autonomy in this area entails would be unlikely to gamer 
consensus.
Although there are many strong arguments for why governments -  which
48Civic associations are not synonymous with civil society, since economic 
and other types of interactions also contribute to the totality of civil society
49Ibid. p. 181.
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
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people do not generally have much of a choice to be ruled by — ought to adhere to 
democratic standards, it is not clear why citizens ought to be protected against the 
elitist or oligarchical tendencies of voluntary associations. Let us say that I 
participate in a voluntary social movement association by paying its dues, attending 
its meetings, and marching in its rallies. Yet I find that my influence as of late has 
been waning, and I increasingly disagree with the direction that the association’s 
leaders are taking our group. Would it not be enough that government protect my 
right to withdraw support from the association? This would allow me to lend my 
talents and support to a different organization, or start a new organization that 
represented like-minded citizens. It seems that this more relaxed civic association 
standard would be just as, if  not more likely to gain consensus, since it would leave in 
tact the many benign hierarchical voluntary associations that people choose to 
participate in.
The Economy
The economy is Held’s fifth site of power. Held thinks that economic 
autonomy requires more than making sure that citizens have enough capital to 
purchase food and shelter. It also entails being free from the negative consequences 
of market failures.52 In particular, Held is concerned with failures which create 
“externalities,” such as the huge economic inequalities that limit citizens ability to 
participate as political equals.53 For Held, these externalities are particularly
52Held 1995, p. 245.
53Ibid., p. 246
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dangerous today because economic globalization amplifies their pernicious effects.54
In order to secure economic autonomy, Held believes that everyone should 
have a right to a basic income (regardless o f whether one is employed).55 Also, Held 
thinks that corporate decision-making should be extended beyond its traditional scope 
of managers, owners, and executives, to include employees, customers, and other 
groups significantly affected by a company’s decisions. But would the participants in 
the thought experiment reach a consensus on such rights? As for the need for 
companies to share their decision-making capacities with their employees, there are 
reasons to believe that it does not exist. One problem is that such a society leaves 
little room for business genius. For example, if I were an investor in Warren Buffett’s 
company, Berkshire Hathaway, why would I want to participate in the decision­
making when the CEO is widely recognized as the greatest investment mind of a 
generation? Or, as a patron of Miramax independent films, why should I have access 
to its decision-making structure? Would there not be a danger that if Miramax’s 
costumers had a say in the type of movies that it puts out, we might see more of the 
big budget, special effects laden, action films? Of course, this may not be what Held 
had in mind. But if Held is serious about affected groups having decision-making 
rights, then certainly there exists a danger that we would eventually live in a type of 
“focus-group hell,” a pernicious tyranny o f the majority the likes of which De 
Toqueville never envisioned.
54Ibid., p. 247.
55Ibid., pp. 193,253.
109
In short, even though the participants in the thought experiment are committed 
to democratic political institutions, it is not clear that they would be in favor of 
insuring democratic structures in business organizations. If citizens’ basic needs are 
met, as they would be with Held’s right to a minimum income, then citizens should be 
able deliberate and vote in a meaningful way. Certainly there are democratic 
problems with income inequality and other economic “externalities,” but these would 
seem to be better handled through the legislation of democratic institutions, rather 
than through irrevocable rights that would likely bring unanticipated and undesired 
consequences.
The Use o f Coercion and Violence
The sixth site o f power deals with the use of coercion and organized violence. 
In order to have autonomy in this area, citizens need rights to peaceful coexistence, 
and lawful foreign policy. But, according to Held, guaranteeing these rights would be 
difficult under an international state system. For starters, in a state system, it would 
be left up to the states themselves to be both judge and jury as to whether they were 
respecting these rights. Furthermore, rather than “lawful foreign policy,” the state 
system perpetuates “the Security Dilemma”: states have strong incentives to 
strengthen their militaries, even though they would each be better off if they all cut 
back the size o f their militaries. This not only leads to international insecurity, but 
also damages opportunities for democratic deliberation because military values, such 
as secrecy, often trump democracy’s need for transparency and information.56
56Ibid., p. 184
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Certainly these are issues that a theory of global government ought to address, 
but would a compelling theory of global governance necessarily have to call for a 
cosmopolitan rather than inter-state solutions? First, it is not entirely true that all 
states sit as judge and jury over their respect for human rights. Increasingly, IGOs and 
other states put pressure (and indeed intervene militarily in extreme situations of 
abuse) on states to respect human rights. As discussed earlier in this chapter, notions 
of state sovereignty over basic human rights have evolved through time. It does not 
seem inconceivable that human rights protection could occur in an international 
system anchored on states’ political power.
Second, Held writes that the Security Dilemma is problematic for the respect 
of citizen autonomy, but then never tells us how we can escape it. This would also be 
troubling for cosmopolitanism, however. As it stands today, states are the only 
political units with standing armies of significance. How would they ever be 
disarmed? This needs to be explained, because if they cannot be disarmed, it would 
seem that cosmopolitan institutions would also have trouble securing rights because 
of the Security Dilemma. Moreover, it is possible that if IGOs were themselves 
armed with militaries, as Held suggests, then the Security Dilemma might be 
exacerbated as states not only compete militarily with other states, but also compete 
militarily with IGOs. Thus, even if Held is correct that individuals in the democratic 
thought experiment would require that rights to lawful foreign policy and peaceful 
coexistence be protected, then it might be preferable to find ways to work within the 
state system, rather than against it.
I l l
Regulatory and Legal Institutions
The last site o f power which Held discusses is the sphere of regulatory and 
legal institutions. In order for citizens to have autonomy in this area, they must be 
ruled fairly by law, which includes not being excluded from participating and 
deliberating on the creation of those laws.57 Thus, nautonomy occurs when citizens 
are ruled by non-democratic regimes, democratic regimes which are unduly 
influenced by military and economic concerns, or regimes in which participation is 
primarily valued from particular races and cultures. Unlike his discussion of other 
sites of power, Held does not make a strong argument that state governments are 
incapable of providing autonomy in this power site. He simply intimates that 
cosmopolitan institutions would do a better job than states.
To sum up, Held has argued that participants in a democratic thought 
experiment would reach a consensus regarding the need for people to have autonomy 
in seven distinct sites of power. Furthermore, Held has outlined the conditions and 
rights that need to be in place in order for citizens to have autonomy in each of these 
areas. Held argues that so long as the international state system remains, most 
necessary conditions and rights will be left unmet. In this section I have tried to show 
that states are, or could be, be more effective in protecting rights to autonomy than 
Held believes. Also, I have argued that Held’s understanding of the consensus on 
rights which would be reached in his democratic thought experiment, often seems too 
demanding and/or controversial, and therefore his arguments are unpersuasive that
57Ibid.,pp. 185, 193.
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states would not be able to meet the mandates of his democratic thought experiment.58
HELD’S COSMOPOLITANISM
It has been my contention in this chapter that Held has failed to persuasively 
demonstrate that states are losing their potency as the most powerful political units, or 
that the need to protect citizen autonomy makes the termination of the state system 
democratically desirable. That said, if Held paints a compelling enough portrait of the 
alternative to the state system, cosmopolitan governance, then certainly his case is 
strengthened. In this section I will outline Held’s proposals for a deliberative, 
democratic, and cosmopolitan world order, then critically examine his ideas.
Synopsis o f Held’s Cosmopolitanism
Although Held writes that many of the specific details of cosmopolitan 
governance would have to be decided upon in a global constitutional convention, he 
does give a fairly detailed account of some of cosmopolitanism’s necessary elements.
58Held also argues for cosmopolitan government based on the connection 
between autonomy and Kant’s call for universal hospitality in Perpetual Peace. 
“Universal hospitality must involve, at the minimum, both the enjoyment of 
autonomy and respect for the necessary constraints on autonomy.. .  Universal 
hospitality is not achieved if, for economic, cultural or other reasons, the quality of 
the life of others is shaped and determined in near or far-off lands without their 
participation, agreement or consent. The conditions of universal hospitality, or, as I 
would rather put it, o f a cosmopolitan orientation, is a cosmopolitan democratic 
public law.” Held, pp. 228-29. I do not discuss this argument in the body of this 
chapter because it seems superfluous. If Held is correct in his interpretation of the 
need for autonomy in the seven sites of power, then the fact that it also can be 
connected to Kant’s ideas of universal hospitality seems to add only minimal weight 
to the arguments persuasiveness. Moreover, Held’s connection of the seven sites of 
power to Kant’s ideas of universal hospitality, which Kant seemed to limit to allowing 
visitors on foreign lands without molestation, seems quite tenuous.
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Held believes that the world ought to be divided into regions (continents), which 
would be governed by cosmopolitan authorities. Above regional governments would 
be universal cosmopolitan government, most likely a reformed United Nations.59 Of 
course the reformation of the UN would have to be quite significant, because as it 
now stands the UN is an inter-state organization.
Held suggests that the UN be transformed into a cosmopolitan organization by 
making it a global parliament, with representatives who are directly accountable to 
the people. Of course such a change from its current structure would be quite 
significant, and Held recognizes that baby steps are in order. Thus, in the short-term, 
Held suggests that the UN creates a cosmopolitan second chamber to compliment its 
current general assembly. Membership in this second chamber would be limited to 
democratic states and NGOs.60 Of course, for this second chamber to be able to 
govern democratically, and for its deliberative qualities to carry meaning, it would 
have to be free from the undemocratic UN Security Council. As it now stands, 
according to Held, the Security Council simply gives more power to those states that 
are already powerful. Held does not want to put an end to the Security Council, 
however. Rather, Held suggests that it be reformed to give significant deliberative
59This would be “above” in terms of scope, but Held envisions that in terms of 
authority it would not necessarily trump regional governments on all issues. Ibid. p. 
272.
60Ibid., 273, 279. The fact that Held includes agencies is interesting. It may 
give the structure more cosmopolitan credentials, but it is not clear how we would 
ever be able to figure out which NGOs should have formal power and which ought to 
be excluded. In a later passage Held recognizes this difficulty in the works of other 
scholars, but does not seem to see how it would affect his own ideas.
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input and decision-making authority to the still developing areas of the world.61 Once 
the Security Council is more deliberative and democratic, the newly created second 
chamber will then have the policy space to begin to provide much needed global 
democratic governance. Held believes that as time passes the democratic and 
cosmopolitan second chamber’s influence will wax, while the not-so-democratic, and 
state-centric, general assembly’s influence wanes. Eventually, along with the state 
system itself, the general assembly will “wither away” as all peoples are represented 
by the cosmopolitan second chamber.62
A reformed cosmopolitan UN would bring democratic governance to global 
economic and security affairs. Economic policy-making and monetary lending 
decisions, which are now handled by a number of independent IGOs (e.g. the WTO, 
IMF, World Bank, and G-7), would be united into one office that would be 
accountable to the global parliament.63 And with concerns of stability and security, 
rather than relying on the willingness of member states to lend troops to its causes, 
under Held’s plan, the reformed UN would amass a voluntary military force which 
would enforce UN mandates. Eventually, as its effectiveness becomes apparent, Held 
believes the UN military force would make nation state military forces redundant and 
unnecessary. Observing this, states would phase out their militaries, putting an end to
61Ibid., p. 279.
62Held is not explicit on exactly how this will take place.
63Ibid., 279.
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the war system itself.64
With cosmopolitan institutions of regional and universal authority, Held 
believes that democratic governments would then be in place from the local level to 
the global. Held suggests a three pronged test to determine which level of 
government ought to have authority over an issue, and thus prevent governmental 
power from being sucked upwards. The first prong tests the “extensiveness” of an 
issue by examining “the range of peoples within and across delimited territories who 
are significantly affected by a collective problem and policy question.”65 The second 
prong tests the “intensity” and “assesses the degree to which the latter [collective 
problem and policy question] impinges on a group of people(s) and, therefore, the 
degree to which national, regional or global legislation or other types of intervention 
are justified.”66 The final prong tests the comparative efficiency of government levels 
and looks at “whether any proposed national, regional or global initiative is necessary 
in so far as the objectives it seeks to meet cannot be realized in an adequate way by 
those operating at ‘lower’ levels of decision-making.”67 Held believes that through 
these three tests, the appropriate level of government will be allowed to govern, and a 
world state avoided.
Critique o f Held’s Cosmopolitanism
MIbid..
65Ibid., p. 236.
66Ibid.
67Ibid.
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From the perspective of participation, deliberation, and democracy, what 
ought we to make of Held’s vision for cosmopolitan global order? It seems that there 
are two problems with Held’s suggestions. First, deliberative democrats are trying to 
figure out ways in which non-elite citizens can have greater influence on political 
deliberations and outcomes.68 By instituting a cosmopolitan world order, it would 
seem that political elites would be even more powerful, and participation 
opportunities of consequence for the average citizens would become more elusive. 
Will Kymlicka notes that debates and deliberations in the European Parliament are 
generally conducted in multi-lingual fora, and that overwhelmingly political elites are 
the only citizens able and/or comfortable participating in political discussions in 
languages not their own.69 Average citizens, even if they understand other languages, 
are generally only willing to debate and discuss complex issues in their native tongue. 
In domestic level politics this problem tends to be mitigated, often because of 
widespread acceptance of an official language. But even in multilingual democracies 
such as Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada, linguistic minorities tend to collect 
in specific territories, and even though state level politics may be discussed in another 
language, they and their representatives deliberate in the citizens native language.
If inter-state representative government is replaced with more cosmopolitan structures
68See, for example, James Fishkin. 1995. The Voice o f the People: Public 
Opinion and Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
69Kymlicka 1999.
70Ibid.
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of government, it would seem that such political deliberations have the potential to 
become less frequent and/or less influential.
Languages difficulties are just one aspect of how regional and global 
parliaments might dilute the political power of average citizens. As it now stands, 
nation states are the primary venues of political power, which means that our world’s 
primary source of political power is distributed across some 200 different actors. 
Certainly the power is not distributed evenly, yet as long as we do not focus on the 
weakest of the weak states, one’s domestic government is still by-and-large the most 
important governmental actor in one’s political life.71 If Held’s regional and universal 
parliaments were implemented, rather than having hundreds of state powers to be 
influenced by citizens, we would only have six regional powers, and one universal 
government to influence.72
Another concern with Held’s cosmopolitan model of governance is that even 
if we were to decide that it would be good for our world, it is not clear how exactly 
we could move from a state centric system to the cosmopolitan one that he suggests. 
States currently have most of the power o f physical coercion in our world.73 Yet Held
71Even though they have never been ranked among the world’s powerful 
states, think of the difference state governments have made in the lives of the citizens 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico -  two countries that were similarly situated 60 years ago, yet 
today their citizens live under completely different economic, social, and legal 
environments, in large part because of their domestic governments’ choices.
72Moreover, as I will discuss shortly, there seems more than a slight possibility 
that through time the reformed UN would become a sort of world state.
73Terrorist organizations and the like are indeed non-state actors that do 
control a fractional amount of physical power. Nonetheless, in the scheme of things
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believes that the states will “wither away” and coercive physical power will primarily 
wielded by a reformed UN.74 Even though Held writes that he does not expect this to 
happen in the short term, simply extending the time horizon is not an adequate 
explanation of how this would be actualized.75 Held writes that the UN will 
eventually have a standing military force, and as this force demonstrates its ability to 
regulate international conflict, domestic states will engage in a type of reverse arms 
race, which will eventually lead to the end of the war system.76
This does not seem plausible. Granted, it is not beyond the realm of 
possibility for the UN to raise a military force. But why would this force cause states 
to disarm? It would be just as reasonable to believe that such a force could have the 
opposite effect: states would not only continue their traditional arms races, but also 
engage in arms races with the increasingly powerful UN. But even this new type of 
arms race were avoided, it does not seem realistic (Held believes that a good theory of 
global governance ought to be realistic) to believe that such a force could provide
their power is minimal. September 11th 2001 demonstrated that terrorist organizations 
are powerful enough to cause some amount of damage to the world s most powerful 
state. But the US’s role as world leader was never threatened by the attacks. 
Moreover, the US could have absorbed many such attacks and still have kept its 
government and its role as the world’s super-power in tact. And, the power of A1 
Quida and the Taliban government which protected it, were severely damaged in the 
US’s retaliatory action.
74Held, 1999, pp. 106-09.
75Nor does it give any type of map for political entrepreneurs willing to foster
the transition.
76Held, 1995, p. 279.
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powerful states like the US or China with the confidence necessary to cut back on 
their military spending. For the UN force to be able to resist US military might and 
give China confidence in cosmopolitanism, for example, it would surely have to wield 
enormous military power —  perhaps even include nuclear weapons.
If the UN were to create a volunteer military force that was strong enough to 
create global security, and states began to dismantle their militaries, what would stop 
the reformed UN from becoming a world state (and bringing with it all the dangers of 
world tyranny that were so worrisome to Kant)? Held has suggested his three 
pronged test to determine which level of government ought to handle specific issues 
and policies. Yet he also suggests that a sub-branch of the reformed UN be instituted 
to judge the outcome of the tests.77 But if  the reformed UN controls military power 
and is the legislative gatekeeper, then it seems that all of the important powers of 
government ultimately reside in the UN. Thus, even though Held does not want the 
reformed UN to become a world state, it is unclear how the lower levels could avoid 
becoming ancillary branches of the UN. And, if there is even a possibility that we 
could end up with world government — something which has been almost universally 
rejected by serious political thinkers — then perhaps it would be wise to steer clear of 
such cosmopolitan institutions.
CONCLUSION
Held believes that his suggestions for cosmopolitan government provide the
77Held, pp. 235-38, 278-86.
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best model for a deliberative and democratic world order. In this chapter, I have 
argued that Held has not persuasively shown his vision to be achievable, or desirable. 
In previous chapters, I have argued that Dennis Thompson and John Dryzek did not 
give enough credibility to the democratic governance potential of IGOs. Perhaps 
surprisingly, I have been critical of Held for disregarding the continued relevance of 
nation states and the international state system. Nevertheless, Held is rightly 
concerned that citizens’ autonomy be protected by some form of democratic 
government. But the cosmopolitan order that he suggests would take many years to 
develop (assuming it ever could be) before it could begin to protect basic rights. At 
least some states, on the other hand, are already in the business of protecting rights. 
And, as Held himself points out, acceptance of state sovereignty is becoming more 
and more dependent on states’ respect for human rights.78 It does not seem 
unreasonable to believe that this trend will continue, and indeed evolve to the point 
that international law, and states themselves, will increasingly recognize that citizens 
have a right to participate meaningfully in democratic institutions and procedures: 
making democratic governance a prerequisite to full state sovereignty. This, of 
course, does not mean that IGOs are unnecessary to global democratic governance. 
But it does mean that to be effective, IGOs should work with state power, rather than 
set themselves up as alternatives to it. Whether and how this might be possible will 
be explored in the next, final chapter.
78Held 1995, pp. 101-04.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion
Although there has been much written about deliberative democracy and 
global governance, little ink has been spilt working through the implications of their 
union. There have been a few attempts, however. This dissertation has critically 
examined three o f the most rigorous o f such attempts, each advocating a different 
venue from which to anchor global deliberative democracy: Dennis Thompson 
advocates deliberatively reconfigured nation states; John Dryzek puts forward 
“discourse networks” within global civil society; and David Held suggests regional 
IGOs working in conjunction with a reformed United Nations.1 Unfortunately, each 
theory has troubling flaws. Without compelling justification, Thompson dismisses 
the democratic role IGOs could play in global governance. Dryzek dismisses formal 
governmental institutions and never explains how to make them acceptably 
democratic, even though the peace and stability such institutions provide are needed 
to nurture his proposed “discourse networks.” And Held suggests a cosmopolitan 
global order without persuasively showing that the replacement of the current state 
system is desirable or even possible.
'Certainly deliberative democrats often mention global concerns and 
implications, but in terms o f  articulating well developed ideas that take seriously the 
differences between domestic and international politics, I believe Thompson, Dryzek, 
and Held have the best articulated theories o f global governance. One possible 
addition would be R aw ls’s Law o f  Peoples. But even though a few scholars consider 
his work to be within the school o f deliberative democracy, many consider him to be a 
liberal contract theorist. For a discussion, see Chambers 2003, p. 308.
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Nevertheless, all three thinkers contribute to the discourse of democratic 
global governance. If domestic states were to become more deliberative in the way 
Thompson suggests, then global governance would be more democratic, fair and 
perhaps even more powerful. Dryzek’s discourse networks could not anchor global 
democracy but they could buttress it. And Held is persuasive in arguing that IGO 
governance is needed if  we are to realize global democratic order.
Can these ideas be combined into a unified theory of global governance? 
Prima facia it would seem not, as each theorist argues that the others’ preferred venue 
is democratically problematic. Despite their prima facia incompatibilities, however, I 
will argue in this concluding chapter that they can be successfully combined. After 
showing that deliberative states, civil society, and IGOs could form a web of 
governance that would protect rights and increase democratic order, I will look at 
issues that need to be further addressed by deliberative democrats. Specifically, I will 
contend that deliberative democrats ought to take IGOs as we now find them: inter­
state organizations which generally meet democratic legitimacy thresholds, yet have 
room for deliberative and democratic improvements. I will outline some reasons for 
believing that deliberative political theory could inform IGO governance and 
conclude my dissertation by looking at the UN Security Council and discussing 
specific reforms that would make it more satisfactorily deliberative and democratic.
A WEB OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Nation states, civil society and IGOs can work together to protect basic human
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rights and to increase the overall depth of democratic global governance. David Held 
believes that for democratic governance to be meaningful, human rights must be 
secured; and to do so requires that global order be cosmopolitan. This, I argue in the 
previous chapter, is problematic because it is not clear that states are decreasingly 
relevant, that cosmopolitan order could supplant the state system, or that if 
implemented, a cosmopolitan order would indeed better protect human rights. 
Nevertheless, one potential problem with an entirely state-centric approach to global 
governance is that many people are not well represented by their states, as 
government officials are sometimes focused on power and enrichment or simply 
govern unwisely.
This is where Held’s cosmopolitan perspective would be an helpful addition to 
state-centric governance. Held contends that it ought not matter in which state one is 
bom as to whether her rights are protected. The statist holds that while it is 
unfortunate that people are bom under governments which cannot or choose not to 
protect their citizens’ rights, such is the nature of the world we live in and to 
disregard that world would make matters worse for larger numbers of people. In fact.
I make this same argument in chapter four. These two positions are compatible, 
however.
The statist is correct that there is little compelling evidence that the state 
system is coming to an end and this needs to be taken into account. Yet this need not 
mean that human rights should not be universally protected. Rawls argues that in 
order for there to be moral obligations to foreign peoples, there must be a “scheme of
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cooperation” between their states.2 Thompson tries to expand what constitutes a 
scheme of cooperation to capture more people than Rawls’s more limited 
understanding; but, as I argue in chapter two, even under a looser interpretation of 
what constitutes a “scheme of cooperation,” those most in need of assistance and 
protection are least likely to live in states that cooperate with other states, and will 
often be left morally unconsidered.
But Rawls and Thompson are mistaken to consider only state-to-state schemes 
of cooperation. Even though states remain our most powerful political entities, IGOs 
have power and significance. IGOs are important in large part because states agree to 
participate in and bind themselves by them, making IGOs a different type of state- 
centric scheme of cooperation.3 More than just state-to-state trading or temporary 
state-to-state war alliances, IGOs are ongoing schemes of cooperation that encompass 
a wide array of issues and cast a long “shadow of the future.”4 Thus, Held’s 
cosmopolitan ideal o f universally protecting human rights is in large part morally 
binding because of the web of state-to-IGO schemes of cooperation.5 And though it
2John Rawls. 1999. Law o f Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
3The most powerful IGOs are inter-state, rather than cosmopolitan, 
organizations. The EU has a significant cosmopolitan branch (the European 
Parliament) but even so, it is primarily a state centric organization.
4On the importance of the “shadow of the future,” see Robert Axelrod. 1984. 
The Evolution o f Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
5For a discussion of how cooperation creates obligations, see Charles Beitz. 
1979. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
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may seem that rogue states might slip through the cracks -  as their governments do 
not participate in the WTO, do not accept aid from the IMF or do not comply with 
many tenets of international law, for example -  they do participate in the largest and 
arguably the most influential IGO scheme of cooperation, the United Nations.
Consider North Korea. Few, if any, states have been more isolated than North 
Korea in recent times, yet it is a UN member-state. Moreover, other states — 
including South Korea, Japan, China, and the US — have negotiated with North 
Korea in attempt to stop it from advancing its nuclear weapons program.6 Held 
contends that security issues extend beyond state borders because modem weapons 
make the whole world insecure.7 This is true, but the conclusion one should draw 
from this is not that states are becoming irrelevant, as Held thinks, but that in order to 
maintain peace, states have to cooperate. Part of that comes through direct 
negotiations which create schemes of cooperation -  and part comes through 
organizations like the UN, which is another type of cooperative scheme. Therefore, if 
North Korea, arguably the most politically isolated state in our world, participates in 
schemes of cooperation, then it is likely that people of all states will be morally 
considered through various state-centric schemes of cooperation — fulfilling the 
cosmopolitan mandate in a state-centric world.
Schemes of cooperation not only create obligations for powerful states to 
assist poor states (and their citizens), but they also weaken the arguments of rogue
6The US has even used food aid as leverage.
7Held 1999, p. 102.
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states, which assert that actions within their borders are only their concern. Powerful 
states (and their citizens) may compellingly claim that they have a moral obligations 
to protect the human rights o f all peoples, including rogue states’ citizens. If a state 
lets its citizens starve, lets them be enslaved or allows the genital mutilation of its 
women, the fact that it chooses not fulfill its moral obligation towards its own citizens 
does not invalidate others’ obligations; and the unjust state would not have a right to 
thwart efforts to secure human rights without a morally compelling reason for doing 
so. The Westphalian ideal of sovereignty has never been, and never should have 
been, respected absolutely, thus it would be problematic for a rogue state to assert a 
right to abuse its citizens on the basis that Westphalian sovereignty has always been, 
or should be, respected.8 And even if a rogue state could do so with some legitimacy, 
other moral considerations would surely outweigh such claims.
Not only do we need IGOs to govern trans-territorial problems, but we also 
need them to unify the world morally by increasing the chances that human rights will 
be widely respected. Global civil society could play a critical role here by making 
certain that these moral obligations are widely recognized and by pressuring 
governments to fulfill their domestic and foreign obligations. Thus, states, IGOs and 
global civil society can work together to protect basic human rights, which, as Held 
argues, is the foundation o f democratic global order.
But is the hope that states, IGOs and global civil society will work together to 
deepen global democratic governance merely “pie in the sky”? I believe not, as there
8See Krasner 1999.
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are a handful of actions that could reasonably be taken to facilitate such an order. 
First, state level democratic, deliberative and transparent institutions ought to be 
encouraged. As our world’s most powerful political institutions become more deeply 
democratic, the overall level of democratic governance in the world should increase. 
Encouragement for states to democratize should come from all three venues of 
democratic governance discussed in this dissertation. Since the end of the Cold War, 
and especially since 9/11, powerful democratic states are not only aware of their 
moral obligations to promote democratic institutions in other states, but are 
increasingly aware of their self-interest in promoting democracy (and the economic 
growth that sustains it).
In addition, IGOs can also influence states to become more democratic. This 
is illustrated well by the EU, which requires democratic domestic institutions in order 
to gain membership, thereby encouraging democratic institutions for states that wish 
to become members and solidifying the democratic commitments of current member- 
states. This does not mean that all IGOs should require democratic institutions for 
states to gain or maintain membership, however, as in some instances to do so would 
detract from an IGO’s governance mandate. But it does mean that IGOs should think 
of ways they can use incentives (and punishments.) to encouragc states to become 
more deeply democratic, without distracting from their institution's overarching 
purpose. Although the IMF and World Bank are often maligned for some of their 
loan conditionality requirements, their recent requirements of governmental 
transparency is a good example of how an IGO can encourage democratic changes
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without compromising its governance mandate.
Moreover, the pressure for states to democratize need not always be directly 
vertical (from IGOs onto states) or horizontal (state-to-state). There should be a 
triangular democratizing relationship between states and IGOs. Democratic states 
should pressure IGOs to do what they can to make states more democratic. And IGOs 
should use their leverage to encourage democratic states to apply horizontal 
democratizing pressures. And, of course, IGOs themselves should become more 
deeply democratic. As with states, the pressure to make these changes should be 
multidirectional: it should come from within,9 from other IGOs,10 and from 
democratic member-states. As states and IGOs become more democratic, increased 
institutional legitimacy will also flow multidirectionally. As states become more 
democratic, their voice and votes in IGOs will be more democratically representative, 
which should increase our confidence that IGO actions are democratic. Likewise, as 
IGOs become more deeply democratic, so do the democratic states which choose to
be bound by their mandates.
O f course, all o f this democratic deepening would be more likely to take place 
if global civil society were “setting the table” by creating a facilitating environment. 
One way to do this would be by holding governmental institutions responsible for
9 An example o f this is the EU continuing to have an internal dialog as to how 
it could deepen its democracy.
‘“Although I am not aware o f formal hearings, leadership in the World Bank 
has been critical of the democratic accountability of the IMF, for example. See 
Stiglitz 2002.
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articulating the steps they are willing to take to deepen their democracy and using the 
power o f publicity to give positive and negative reinforcement. In doing so, civil 
society actors should be constructive and not simply label all powerful IGO as being 
hopelessly undemocratic, as this misses important democratic distinctions. The WTO 
operates much differently than the World Bank, which operates differently from the 
IMF, for example.11 Civil society thinkers and actors need to move beyond the 
politics of blame and focus our governance discourse on how states and IGOs could 
realistically make themselves more deliberative and democratic.
In the past, positive changes have come about from the type of civil society 
pressure and constructive criticism that I am advocating. The World Bank was widely 
criticized in the public sphere for not taking advantage of local knowledge and NGO 
expertise, for example. The democratic shortcomings were outlined, the solution 
articulated, and without formal legislation from powerful states or other IGOs, the 
World Bank made positive, democratic changes. With regards to the much maligned 
WTO, it seems that civil society actors ought to follow a similar path, rather than 
wishing that the organization would simply go away.12 The WTO’s consensus voting
HSome argue that they are similar in that they are all controlled by wealthy, 
powerful states. And to some extent this may be true. But even so, there are reasons 
to believe that these organizations are not liabilities to global democratic governance. 
See chapters two and three.
12Those scholars who believe that the WTO should go away need to do a 
better job of explaining how it would be possible to make it disband. If there is no 
way to make the WTO disband, then scholars should take account of its presence into 
their theories, in much the same way that the presence of nuclear weapons should be 
recognized rather than wished away.
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procedure is not inherently undemocratic, yet because it gives so much weight to the 
status quo, adopting a different voting procedure would likely be a democratic 
improvement, for example. Clearly and forcefully articulating the type of voting 
procedure that would be preferable and the ethical and practical reasons why the 
WTO and its member-states should want such a change would be one of the many 
important contributions that global civil society could make towards improving 
democratic global governance.
States, IGOs and global civil society could work together to form a web of 
global democratic governance. Not only should each venue serve as a democratic 
watchdog of the others, but they should work together to form a positive spiral of 
support on issues such as universal respect for human rights and increasing the depth 
of democratic representation. Of states, IGOs and global civil society, IGOs have 
been the most under-appreciated by scholars of deliberative democracy. This is not to 
say they have gone unconsidered. Thompson, Dryzek and Held all examine IGOs, for 
example. But each believes that as we now find them, IGOs cannot make a 
significant contribution to democratic governance. Even Held, who anchors his 
theory of democratic global governance on IGOs, believes they need to be 
revolutionized into cosmopolitan organizations before they can provide beneficial 
democratic governance. I have argued in this dissertation that this view is mistaken, 
and I believe that once recognized as such, deliberative democrats should guide the 
discourse of global governance by articulating how IGOs could make realistic (rather 
than revolutionary) changes to provide more justifiable and efficacious governance.
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DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND IGO GOVERNANCE
There are many ways that deliberative democracy could inform IGO 
governance and in this concluding chapter I will not be able to exhaustively explore 
the topic. I will make some preliminary arguments to give direction to future 
scholarship, however. I will begin by outlining some basic reasons to believe that 
making IGOs more deliberative could be expected to improve their governance.13 
After arguing in the abstract that ideas of deliberative democracy could benefit IGO 
governance, I will conclude the dissertation by looking at the types of concrete 
reforms deliberative theory would suggest for a real world IGO, the much maligned 
UN Security Council.
Why Deliberative IGOs?
Increasing the quality of deliberation in IGOs would provide decision-makers 
with more information by allowing their members to hear ideas and facts to which 
they otherwise would not have been exposed. Within non-deliberative political 
institutions, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, for decision-makers to surmise 
accurately the perspectives of other individuals and groups.14 Moreover, non-
13I follow the argumentative strategy of Thompson. Thompson does not argue 
that domestic states are thoroughly undemocratic and ought not be obeyed. Nor does 
he argue that no quality deliberation takes place within their current decision making 
structures. Rather, he accepts states’ entrenched place in our political world, yet 
shows how deliberatively reforming state institutions would deepen their legitimacy.
14Even if experts were brought in to inform decision-makers of the interests 
and perspectives of relevant individuals and groups, it seems mistaken to think 
officials could know as much about peoples’ thoughts as they do. See Jurgen 
Habermas. 1999. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Transl. 
Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press, p.67.
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deliberative institutions filter out information before it reaches decision-makers. It is 
often left to bureaucrats and “experts” to decide which information is superfluous, 
without the opportunity for those affected to discuss the merits with decision­
makers.15 The International Monetary Fund of the 1970s and 1980s had a more-or- 
less “one size fits all” set of austerity policies that economically troubled states were 
required to implement in order to receive much needed loans, for example. Recipient 
states and third-party observers often complained that if the IMF would have listened 
to local knowledge, rather than relying solely on their economists, an efficacious and 
humane set of context sensitive policies would have done much more to aid troubled 
states.16
One objection to deliberative democracy is that it is impossible to actually 
have a meaningful deliberation in which each perspective is fairly represented and
15Of course loosening the filter mechanism would also lead to time spent 
listening to information that truly is superfluous, thereby slowing down the political 
process. But it seems intuitive that aside from certain types of emergency situations, 
better informed decisions ought to be generally preferred over less informed, although 
quicker, ones. That said, however, there are trade-offs between informing the 
decision-making process and conserving scarce resources (time and money). Even 
when not in an emergency situation, we would not want our deliberative institutions 
to debate for weeks on end proposals that all agree are of little significance. Although 
I do not explore thresholds for determining when deliberation should be cut off and a 
vote taken, it does not seem overly controversial that we ought to be willing to expend 
reasonable amounts o f time and money in order to facilitate better informed decisions.
16This is not to say that the troubled states would have been better off being 
left alone. But I am contending that a more deliberative approach to economic 
assistance would have likely led to better results. Indeed, the IMF does seem to be 
showing more sensitivity to context in its loan conditions, although many critics 
remain unimpressed. See Joseph Stiglitz 2002; Noam Chomsky. 1999. Profit Over 
People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. New York: Seven Stories Press.
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authentically heard, once one goes beyond a small community.17 Clearly, as 
Habermas recognizes, the “ideal speech situation” is pragmatically impossible.18 
Nevertheless, political institutions can move towards deliberative ideals. Within 
domestic political institutions, political parties often represent different perspectives, 
for example. Granted, the deliberation which takes place between members of 
different political parties does not provide as many perspectives as would Habermas’s 
ideal speech situation, but political parties are still a useful deliberative tool which 
allows access to information and knowledge that would otherwise go unconsidered.19
If deliberation is less than ideal within domestic political institutions, then one 
might assume that it becomes even less ideal as it moves to the international level. 
There is reason to believe that IGOs have the potential to come closer to the 
deliberative ideal, with regards to diversity of perspectives, than domestic institutions, 
however. The deliberative costs of domestic political parties (such as their tendency 
to minimize internal dissension) are generally outweighed by the deliberative benefits 
their presence provides.20 Where domestic political institutions rely on political 
parties to facilitate debate and discussion, IGOs rely on state representatives. Because 
IGOs tend to have more member states than domestic governments have political 
parties, there is reason to believe that IGO deliberations should be characterized by
"See Dahl 2000.
18See Chambers 1996, p. 156.
19 See Manin 1987, pp. 357-359.
20Ibid.
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more independent perspectives than domestic political deliberations. This is not to 
say that there are no voting alliances within international institutions. Nevertheless, 
international “voting blocs” tend to be less hierarchical than domestic political 
parties.21 Thus, if one is persuaded that the use of political parties does not preclude 
states from the epistemic benefits of deliberation, then one ought to be persuaded that 
IGOs could also realize the epistemic benefits of increased and/or higher quality 
deliberation.
Reforming IGOs to make them more deliberative could also be expected to 
better inform their member states’ priorities. Despite assumptions made by some 
social contract and rational choice theorists, preferences can change:22 “During 
political deliberation, individuals acquire new perspectives not only with respect to 
possible solutions, but also with respect to their own preferences.”23 That said, there 
is a difference between asserting that persons may change their preference orderings 
and asserting that states may do so. Historically, the international relations literature 
has often assumed that states prioritize power and wealth above all else.24 It ought not
21 See Werner Field and Robert Jordan. 1994. International Organizations: A 
Comparative Approach. London: Praeger, pp. 148-150.
22Both Rousseau and Rawls make assumptions regarding the stability of 
preference orderings. See Manin 1987, p. 351. For a case study on how the 
preferences of anglophones and francophones in Quebec were modified through 
discourse, see chapter 14 in Chambers’s, Reasonable Democracy.
23Manin 1987, p.350.
24See Hans Morganthau. 1973. Politics Among Nations. New York: Knopf; 
Waltz 1979.
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be assumed that these preferences would not be modified if states are given 
compelling reasons for doing so, however.25 If it could be persuasively argued that 
environmental problems are dire enough that immediate ecological cooperation is 
needed, for example, then a state that entered the deliberation seeking to promote its 
economic growth might rationally modify (not necessarily abandon) that preference.
In fact, most developed states have taken actions to reduce their carbon 
dioxide and other green house gasses production despite the economic costs. 
President Bush declared that the United States would not adhere to the Kyoto 
Protocol due to a domestic “energy crisis.” This declaration illustrates that it may 
take the perception o f a crisis for a state to fall back into a “wealth and power at all 
costs” position, however. A skeptic might say that Bush was simply looking for an 
excuse not to pay the economic costs of protecting the environment. But even if this 
is true of Bush and the US, the fact that many other states continue to forgo the 
economic benefits o f polluting the environment shows that Bush’s position is the 
exception among developed states. This in turn strongly suggests that we ought take 
into consideration the potential epistemic benefits of preference-informing 
deliberative IGO fora.
Reforming the Security Council
By making IGOs more deliberative, more perspectives would be heard, better
informed policies crafted and member states would be held accountable for their 
preferences and actions. But beyond abstract musings, what types of concrete
25See Wendt 1999, pp. 92-138.
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changes are needed? O f course, it is outside the scope of this dissertation to examine 
all important IGOs and suggest reforms. Nevertheless, I will suggest a few concrete 
reforms for the UN Security Council to illustrate how an IGO could take steps 
towards deliberative and democratic ideals, and to show that such improvements need 
not go against powerful member-states’ interests.26
The Security Council has five permanent members — the US, Britain, France, 
Russia, and China — and ten members elected to two-year terms by the General 
Assembly. Nine of the fifteen members must vote in the affirmative for the Council 
to pass policy. On substantive (as opposed to procedural) votes, none of the five 
permanent members can cast votes in opposition to a proposal for it to pass. This 
gives each permanent member a veto over all substantive resolutions.
There are three important ways in which the Security Council falls short of 
democratic and deliberative ideals. First, it falls short in terms of representation. The 
mission of the Security Council is to govern security issues throughout the world, yet 
the vast majority of states are without permanent membership. Second, the voting 
procedure falls short o f the democratic ideal of “one member/one vote,” as permanent 
members’ veto gives them much greater influence over outcomes than that of two- 
year temporary members.27 And third, Security Council deliberations are less than
26Note that these suggestions are meant to be illustrative, and not an 
exhaustive list of possible Security Council improvements.
27Despite the power differential, there is stiff competition among states to get 
temporary Security Council seats. See David Malone. 2000. Eyes on the Prize: The 
Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security Council. Global Governance. 6: 
pp .3-23.
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ideal, the problems of representation and voting mean that permanent members’ 
voices are greatly amplified and likely to be considered more carefully than temporary 
members’, decreasing the odds that the “force of the better argument” will win the 
day.
Despite these imperfections, I do not think the Security Council has an 
obligation to reform itself radically. In order for the Council to have an obligation to 
make radical changes, it would have to be shown that the Council is exercising 
illegitimate power, something which has not been persuasively done.28 Moreover, if 
power were taken from the permanent members -  enough for the change to be 
considered “radical” — overall democratic governance would likely suffer even 
though Council procedures move closer to ideal. If the Security Council were to give 
its powers over to the more democratic General Assembly, for example, Council 
powers would likely be drastically diminished, as current permanent member-states 
would have less incentive to lend their prodigious influence to support policies they 
had little role in crafting. Thus, whatever amount of democratic control over 
Hobbesian (or perhaps Lockean)29 international anarchy that the Security Council has 
achieved would be diminished or lost altogether, harming the overall project of 
democratic governance. Surely the most perfectly democratic and deliberative 
Security Council would be o f trivial significance if it lacked the power to influence,
28See chapters two and three.
29For a discussion o f the differences between Hobbesian and Lockean 
international anarchy, see Wendt 1999.
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coerce, or in other ways order our world.
Though radical changes do not appear to be required, there are normative and 
practical reasons for permanent members to take steps towards making the Security 
Council a more deliberative and democratic institution. Four of the five permanent 
members have democratic domestic institutions and therefore have a normative 
interest in making their states’ international venues of participation, such as the 
Security Council, more democratic. But even if states are primarily concerned with 
power in the international arena, there is still reason for permanent members to make 
the Security Council more deliberative and democratic.
IGOs are not set up as ends in and o f themselves. IGOs are instituted to 
provide order and control over aspects of international relations, often benefitting 
powerful states by lessening the chance that chaotic relations will alter current power 
distributions.30 Thus, if  democratic and deliberative reforms could help the Security 
Council better order global security affairs, as I will argue, then there are self-interest 
incentives for permanent members to give up some of their Security Council control 
(although, probably not a large portion). In the mid 1990s, for example, the United 
States demonstrated a willingness to lessen the relative power of its veto by 
supporting the UN Interaction Council’s recommendation that Germany and Japan be
30There are many traditions in International Relations thought which believe 
this: neo-liberal institutionalism, hegemonic stability theory and long cycle theory, for 
example.
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given permanent membership.31 In fact, when, in 1992, the General Assembly placed 
on its agenda the “Question o f equitable representation on and increase in the 
membership of the Security Council,” the US, France, and Britain all went on record 
supporting the expansion of permanent membership, and China and Russia supported 
membership expansion without specifying their position with regards to permanent 
membership.32
Permanent membership on the Security Council ought to be expanded, as 
doing so would benefit democratic global governance in four important ways. First, 
permanent membership on the Council is far from the democratic ideal of one 
state/one vote and an expansion of permanent membership would move the Council 
closer to that ideal. Even though the Interaction Council’s recommendation of adding 
Japan and Germany as permanent members would have only been an increase of two 
permanent member-states, that still would have been a forty percent increase in the 
number of states with veto power, representing a significant democratic step. Second, 
if new permanent member states are democracies, then their addition to the Council 
will increase the relative influence o f democratic states and thereby add to the overall 
amount of democratic global governance. Third, by increasing the number of states 
with permanent membership, there would be greater diversity of perspectives
31Madeline K. Albright. 2003. Why the United Nations is Indispensable. 
Foreign Policy. September/October: 16-24; Interaction Council, Report on the 
Conclusions and Recommendations by a High-Level Group on the Future o f the 
Global Multilateral Organisations, The Hague: Interaction Council. 1994. p. 8.
32See Bruce Russett, Barry O’Neill, and James Sutterlin. 1996. Breaking the 
Security Council Restructuring Logjam. Global Governance. 2: 65-80.
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represented in Secuirty Council discourse, moving the Council closer to deliberative 
ideals. And fourth, there are states which play important roles in global security 
affairs which are without permanent membership. Giving at least some of these states 
permanent membership on the Security Council, and thereby adding their influence to 
Security Council decisions, should make the Council better able to provide 
democratic order within international anarchy.33
What criteria should be considered in choosing new permanent member- 
states? As it is an assumption o f this dissertation that we are interested in democratic 
global governance, it seems that a logical first requirement would be that new 
permanent member-states are democracies. Once a list of democratic states has been 
compiled, there are three further considerations that should be weighed in order to 
rank the states. First, states with larger populations should be preferred over smaller 
states, as they have a greater democratic claim to the power of permanent 
membership, ceteris paribus, than states that represent fewer people.
Second, how potential member-states might add diversity to Security Council 
discourse ought to be considered. Even though this criterion might be criticized as 
being overly subjective, how a state could add to Security Council diversity is worth 
considering. When discussing domestic institutions, deliberative democrats almost 
unanimously agree that though no two people are the same, adding the perspectives of 
under-represented genders, races, or economic backgrounds to political discourse
j3This final conclusion, that democratic order would be increased, assumes 
that additional permanent member-states would be democracies.
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enriches the quality o f deliberation. Likewise, though no two states are the same, it 
would seem that adding a state from an unrepresented continent, that has a different 
religious or cultural heritage, or a state that has unique security concerns, would 
enrich Security Council discourse and deliberation.
Along with population size and diversity, the economic and military power of 
the potential new member-states ought to be considered.34 The core purpose of the 
Security Council is not to be a beacon o f democracy, but rather to bring order to 
international anarchy. The more power that new member-states bring to the Security 
Council, the more likely that the Council will have the influence to enforce its 
mandates. Furthermore, because the Security Council often deals with highly 
contentious issues, intra-council coercion is not unheard of. If new member-states are 
relatively powerful, then they should be in a better position to resist political arm 
twisting, increasing the odds that the better argument carries the day.
When ranking states, how much relative weight should be given to each of 
these three considerations? This question would certainly have to be debated in 
actual UN Security Council and General Assembly deliberations but, that said, all 
three criteria are critical to deliberative and democratic order. The population 
consideration is important to democratic representation. Diversity of perspectives is 
important to the quality o f  Security Council deliberations. And power is important to 
providing order. Since we are interested in all three, then perhaps it would be most
34Michael Glennon has a well written essay on the importance of considering 
how state power plays a role in Security Council dynamics. Michael Glennon. 2003. 
Why the Security Council Has Failed. Foreign Affairs. 82 (3): 16-36.
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prudent to give each consideration equal weight. Although I certainly do not want to 
preclude actual deliberations, given these criteria it would seem that India, South 
Africa, Brazil, Japan, and Turkey might each have compelling cases for being selected 
to fill any new permanent member seats.
If I am correct that in order to improve the democratic governance of the 
Security Council, the Council should expand the number of permanent seats 
(according to criteria outlined above), then exactly how many seats should be added? 
We ought to try to move as close to deliberative and democratic ideals as possible 
given the limitations imposed by the interests of current permanent member-states.35 
The Interaction CounciPs recommendation o f adding two states, Germany and Japan, 
looks to have been too ambitious, as it failed to be accepted.36 If adding two seats is 
too ambitious, and maintaining the status quo is deliberatively and democratically 
unsatisfactory, then this leaves us with adding one permanent member-seat.
Although any movement towards deliberative and democratic ideals (that does 
not compromise the Security Council’s effectiveness) is better than nothing, adding 
only one seat seems a disappointingly modest move. If that one seat were to be 
shared, however, then perhaps quite significant deliberative and democratic 
improvements could flow from the relatively modest reform. I suggest that four states
35A charter amendment is necessary to expand the permanent membership on 
the Security Council and, according the Article 108 of the UN constitution, 
amendment requires the formal consent of all the veto powers.
36Or, it could be that two new seats was not overly ambitious, rather it was the
choice of states that was problematic. It is hard to imagine two other states that 
would have “sealed the deal,” however.
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initiatives to pass. In essence, this would give each of the original permanent 
members, and the new permanent member in its six month rotation, halfot'a \eto, 
alleviating concerns that a new member would use its term to grind C ourH.il actions t>> 
a halt (as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War). Furthermore, this change would 
give incentive for original permanent members to ha\e sincere discourse with new 
permanent members, as they may need their vole to get eround a dissenting permanent 
member. And a dissenting original permanent member would also havt incentive 10 
have sincere discourse with the new member, as  u s  vote would be needed lo block 
proposed policy. Moreover, the “shadow of the future" would give original 
permanent member-states incentive to discursively engage new member sta tes which 
are not currently holding the veto power (or. more preciseK half-veto power), as their 
six month stints are never more than a year and a half away. '
These changes in representation and voting would not only increase the 
quality of deliberation and the scope of democratic representation, hut would likclv
380 f  course, a skeptic might respond that “sincere discour > would he limited 
to strategic bargaining. I do not think this would be the case, however Ihonun Ri-.se 
is persuasive in claiming that when state representatives engage in deliberation lor 
simply argue) over policy outcomes, significant changcs in p o l io  positions hr\on,l 
what can be explained by strategic bargaining -  can occur. For example, strategic 
bargaining alone cannot explain the final negotiated settlement ending the Cold War. 
nor can it explain many o f the policy changes of state governments accused of h u u n  
rights violations; Thomas Risse. 2000. “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in 
World Politics. International Organization. 54(1): 1-39 See also Inedruh 
Kratochwil. 1989. Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the CtmdMomof Practical and 
legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic .{flairs Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press; Nicholas Onuf. 1989. World o f Om Making Rtdts m i  
Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: UnivcfriQrofSontil 
Carolina Press; and Wendt 1999.
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improve Security Council efficacy due to increased perceptions of legitimacy, better 
informed policies, and because voting procedure changes would allow the Council to 
act more often. Moreover, given that five of the six vetoes would be wielded by 
democratic states, enough to pass substantive initiatives, these changes should 
increase the overall level o f  democratic global governance.
Some might object that these proposed changes are too modest.39 I disagree. 
But so long as calls for more ambitious reforms consider how they would affect the 
Security Council’s ability to govern, which means taking into consideration the self- 
interest of permanent members, then such proposals would be a welcome contribution 
to the discourse of democratic global governance. As it stands, unfortunately, 
proposals for Security Council reforms by democratic theorists are too often simply 
wish lists. Danielle Archibugi, for example, writes that permanent members' vetoes 
should be abolished, while civil society actors and regional organizations (such as the 
EU) should be given Security Council seats and votes. Yet Archibugi never addresses 
how taking away Security Council influence from our world’s most powerful states
39In fact, by not discussing certain aspects of potential reform, it is not even a 
complete proposal. For example, I did not discuss whether the six new permanent 
members should take the seats o f six of the two year members (reducing the number 
of temporary members elected by the General Assembly from ten to four), or whether 
the General Assembly should continue to vote in ten members, increasing the total 
number of Security Council states from 15 to 21. Or, should the difference be split 
and the General Assembly select eight, two-year members? (My inclination is that 
splitting the difference would be the best.) Regardless, I believe that the changes I 
have suggested would be a marked improvement, as deliberation, democratic 
representation and the efficacy of the Security Council would all likely be improved. 
Moreover, the suggestions I have outlined are meant to be illustrative and not 
exhaustive.
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might affect those states’ willingness to support Council decisions, or how the 
Council could provide order without the cooperation of powerful states, or even how 
such changes would come about if current veto states resisted such reforms.40
As theorists and philosophers think about potential deliberative and 
democratic reforms for the Security Council, they ought not create a false dichotomy 
between democratic ideals and power politics. Rather, they ought to be thinking of 
how to maximize democratic reforms in light of the states’ powers and interests. If 
this is done, then perhaps more novel suggestions -  such as this chapter’s proposal to 
have states share veto power -  will inform the civil society discourse on how to 
deepen democratic global governance. As global civil society discourse becomes 
more applicable to our all too real world, then perhaps greater pressure can be brought 
to bear on the UN, the Security Council, and the Council’s permanent member states, 
to take reasonable steps towards deliberative and democratic ideals.
CONCLUSION
Given the many problems of today’s world, there are compelling reasons to 
seek global governance. If we believe that governmental power should be exercised 
democratically, then we should, of course, be interested in how to best provide 
democratic global governance. As recent democratic political theory has taken a
40Daniele Archibugi. 1998. P r i n c i p l e s  of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In Re- 
imagining Political Community. Eds. Archibugi, Held, and Kohler. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. David Held is guilty of the same oversights m Democracy
and the Global Order.
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“deliberative turn,” political thinkers ought to explore how ideas of deliberative 
democracy can inform our search for democratic global governance. In this 
dissertation I critically examined three deliberative democrats’ theories of global 
democracy, each focusing on a different venue of governance. I argued throughout 
that each scholar’s theory positively contributes to the discourse of global governance, 
yet each suffers by not fully considering other potential venues of governance. In this 
final chapter, I have tried to show that domestic states, global civil society and IGOs 
can work together to provide deliberative and democratic global governance. Yet 
even though combining the three venues provides a more compelling framework for 
deliberative and democratic global governance, much work remains for democratic 
thinkers.
There are four areas that deliberative democrats should address in future 
scholarship on global governance. First, deliberative democrats need to flesh out 
exactly how different venues of democratic governance can work together. In this 
chapter I have provided a brief argument to show that such cooperation is possible 
and would be profitable. Nevertheless, details of their interactions need to be 
explored further. I suggested, for example, that global civil society should play one of 
two roles; it can be a watch dog that uses the power of publicity to hold formal 
governmental organizations accountable, and it can be an ideas generator in which 
“discourse networks” form to figure out how best to address particular problems. But 
perhaps there are other ways for global civil society to contribute to democratic global 
governance. And likely there are other profitable ways for states and IGOs to
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cooperate with each other, and with global civil society, that have not been 
considered.
The second issue that future scholarship of deliberative democracy ought to 
address is the distinction between an institution falling short of democratic ideals and 
an institution being democratically illegitimate. One possible reason that there has 
not been more written by deliberative democrats on the potential for cooperation 
between states, IGOs, and global civil society is that the word “undemocratic” has 
often been used imprecisely, causing scholars to prematurely disregard the democratic 
potential of various institutions. Certainly, as democrats, we ought to want 
undemocratic institutions to be revolutionized into democratic ones. Nevertheless, 
simply pointing out that there are aspects of an institution which fall short, perhaps 
well short, of democratic ideals does not mean that the institution is illegitimate and 
in need of revolution. Future research needs to develop a better understanding of 
“democratic thresholds.” When ought an institution be considered a legitimate 
democratic organization, and when ought we say that it is undemocratic? As scholars 
begin to answer this question, they also need to be aware oi how democratic 
thresholds might differ between the contexts of states, IGOs, and global civil society. 
Developing a better understanding of democratic thresholds does not mean that the 
work o f showing how institutions fall short of democratic and deliberative ideals 
ought to come to a halt, however, as it is important to be aware that institutions which 
meet democratic thresholds still should take steps towards deliberative and
democratic ideals.
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Closely related to the need to explore democratic thresholds in all venues of 
governance, is the need for future scholarship to pay greater attention to IGOs. The 
role of the judiciary, the necessity of basic rights for citizens, the parameters of 
appropriate speech in legislative argumentation, fair representation, and the duties of 
citizens, to name but a few areas of domestic governance, have all been extensively 
explored by scholars of deliberative democracy. This same level of attention, or at 
least something close to it, needs to be given to IGO governance. IGOs are playing an 
ever more important role in global governance. Yet, there are numerous areas basic to 
IGO governance -  such as states’ rights in and duties to IGOs, appropriate and 
inappropriate exclusion o f non-democratic states from IGO membership, and the way 
that different voting procedures affect the quality of IGO discourse and deliberation — 
which have, at best, received only superficial attention. If the “deliberative turn” in 
democratic scholarship is to last in an era of increasing globalization, then 
deliberative democrats need to do a better job informing our judgements of IGO 
governance.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as deliberative democrats put forward 
ideas of global governance they need to begin their theories with the world as we find 
it. When outlining the need for change, deliberative democrats often acknowledge the 
world as it is, but once they begin to develop their theories, it seems that the world is 
suddenly well down the road to change, without explanation as to how it got there. 
How does the WTO come to an end? How did we decide which civil society groups 
would get a seat on the Security Council? Why did powerful states cede their power
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to regional organizations? Certainly it worth discussing whether these and other 
proposed changes are desirable, but whether they are possible also needs to be 
addressed. Our world faces very real problems: widespread famine, children dying 
from readily preventable diseases, environmental degradation, and terrorism, to name 
but a few. We simply are not in a position to neglect governance until perfectly ideal 
sources of order can be achieved. Certainly there is a place in deliberative political 
theory for utopian thought. But for those whose basic rights are unprotected and 
unmet, the most helpful contributions will come from thinkers who not only show us 
the ideal, but explain how states, civil society, and IGOs can take real steps towards 
creating a better world.
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